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IN 'rHE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2376 
RICHMOND FOOD STORES, INCORPORATED, 
versus 
CITY OF RICHMO~D. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Il onorable Ohief Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virgvnia: 
Your Petitioner, Richmond' Food Stores, Incorporated, of 
Richmond, Virginia, respectfully represents that it is ag-
grieved by a :final order entered in the above-entitled cause 
by the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond on the 9th 
day of M:ay, 1940, whereby the application of the Petitioner 
for relief from alleged erroneous assessments of city whole-
sale merchant's license taxes made against it by the City of_ 
Richmond for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, was denied. 
The transcript of the record of the proceedings in the Hust-
ings Court of the City of Richmond herewith presented shows 
the following case : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
On June 7, 1939, the Petitioner, in accordance with the pro- -
visions of Section 414 of the Tax Code of Virginia, filed . 
2* in the Hustings Court *of the City of Richmond its appli-
cation in writing (R., p. 2) for the c~rrection of an alleged 
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erroneous assessment of city wholesale merchant's license 
taxes made by the Commissioner of the Revenue of the City 
of Richmond on April 15, 1939, whereby it was charged with 

























The application alleged that the Petitioner is not a mer-
ehant, and that it is not liable for the aforesaid wholesale 
merchant's license taxes assessed against it by the City of 
Richmond, and that it has duly and regularly paid all taxes 
for which it is liable to the City of Richmond for the said 
years 1937, 1938 and 1939, and that the aforesaid wholesale 
merchant's license taxes assessed against it were, therefore, 
erroneous, illegal, null and void. ,Vheref ore, the .Applicant 
prayed that the Court review the said assessment, declare 
the same erroneous, illegal, null and void, and enter its order 
correcting and annulling the same and exonerating the Ap-
plicant from the payment of the said taxes charged thereby. 
On the 15th day of September, 1939, the City of Richmond 
filed its answer to the said application (R., p. 11), and the 
case was heard before Judge John L. Ingram, at which time 
certain testimony and exhibits were presented to the court, a 
stenographic transcript of which is a part of the record at-
tached to this .Petition. "\¥hereupon, the c~mrt took the mat-
ter under advisement, and on the 9th day of May, 1940, en-
tered its order (R., p. 17) denying- the Petitioner the re-
8* lief sou~ht in its *application, to which order of the court 
the Petitioner, by counsel, excepted and now seeks a writ 
of error from this Honorable Court. 
FACTS IN THE CASE. 
The Petitioner is an association composed, at the time of_ 
the hearing in the lower court, of 155 retail g-rocers, whose 
places of business are located in the City of Richmond and 
vicinity (R., p. 57). The org·anization was formed by the re-
tai.1 grocers as a co-operative buying- organization to enable 
the small retail stores to buy collectively ai1d thereby to ob-
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tain the advantage of purchasing their merchandise in large 
quantities, so as to meet the chain store competition which 
threatens the existence of the smaller independent mer-
chants. 
When the Association was first organized, it obtained a 
charter under Chapter 151 of the Code of Virginia as a non-
stock, non-profit organization and operated as such for sev-
eral years. Since, however, its organization was, in fact, a 
co-operative association, and the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia had specifically provided for the incorporation of co-
operative associations under Section 3855 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, and its purposes and operations conformed more closely 
to the provisions of Section 3855 than to the provisions of 
Chapter 151 of the Code of Virginia, the Association subse-
quently determined to re-organize under that Section. 
On April 28, 1937, the non-stock corporation was dissolved 
and the Petitioner was incorporated as a co-operative asso-
ciation under the provisions of Section 3855 of the Code of 
Virginia. Although the said Section 3855 provides that the 
word "co-operative" shall be a part of the name of any as-
sociation incorporated thereunder, the State Corporation 
Commission would not permit tho use of the word "co-op-
erative" as a part of the name of the Petitioner, because 
4-* of the fact that Section 21 of the *Co-operative Marketing 
Act enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia subse-
quent to Section 3855 of the , Code prohibits the use of the 
word "co-operative" as a part of the name of any associa-
tion other thijn a co-operative· marketing association organ-
ized under the provisions of said Act (R., p. 23). 
The Petitioner's corporate organization and operations con-
form in every detail to the provisions of Section 3855 of the 
Code of Virginia. Although the said Section requires the is-
~mance of stock, the stock issued by the Petitioner has prac-
tically no value other than that of providing the prerequisite 
required for membership in the Association. "\V11en the Pe-
titioner first re-organized, the ownership of three shares of 
stock was required as a prerequisite to membership. This re-
quirement has subsequently been increased to the ownership 
of five shares of stock. The said shares of stock entitle the 
owner to no voting- privileg·es in the management of the af-
fairs of the Association. No dividends are declared or paid 
on the stock and, in the event of liquidation or dissolution of 
the Association, the stockholders participate in tho distribu-
tion of its assets only to the extent of the par value of the 
stock. No shares of stock have been issued to or are owned 
bv others than members of the Association, and no member 
of the Association owns more than the number of shares re-
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quired to qualify for membership. There were at the time of 
the hearing in the lower court 53'9 shares of stock issued and 
outstanding, all of which are owned and held by the 155 mem-
bers of the Association ( R., p. 31). The transfer of the stock 
is restricted by the charter, which provides that whenever 
any stockholder desires to sell his stock, he shall first offer it 
to the Association for purchase by the Association, or by a 
person or persons designated by the board of directors 
51: of the Association at a *fair price to be conclusively de-
termined by the board of directors, which price shall in 
no event exceed the par value of the said stock. 
Voting power in the ABsociation is vested by its charter in 
its members, ea.ch of "'hom is entitled to one and only one 
vote, regardless of the number of shares of stock he may own 
in the Association. Although the Association does not at-
tempt to operate at a profit, in the event any surplus results 
from its operl;ltions, such surplus· is distributed under its by-
laws to the members of the Association on a patronage basis 
in proportion to the business done by each member with and 
through the Association, and in the event any deficit results 
from its operations, such de,ficit is similarly distributed. 
;£ts charter provides that, in the event of any liquidation 
or dissolution or winding up (whether ·voluntary or involun-
tary) of the Association, then, after the payment of all debts 
of the Association, the remaining· asset~, if any, shall be di-
vided between the stockholders in proportion to the amount 
of stock held by each, but not to exceed the par value of such 
stock; the then remaining assets, if any, shall be divided be-
tween the members of the Association in proportion to the 
amount of business done with or through the Association. 
The charter of the Association provides that its purposes 
are to be carried out on a non-profit basis in the interest of 
the member~ of the Association, in accordance with the pro-
visions .of Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia, and the As-
sociation operates accordingly. Past experience has shown 
that. its cost of operation is approximately 4% of the pur- . 
chase price of the merchandise bought for its members. The 
Association, therefore, operates on a 4% commission 
6* which is uniformly applied to a11 *merchandjse distributed 
to its members except vegetables. The Association did 
not handle vegetables prior to March, 1939, but during that 
month a vegetable department was irn;;talled. Obviously, by 
reason of the hig·hly perishable nature of vegetables, the com-
mission thereon would have to be larger than on less perish-
able merchandise to cover losses, and the Assoeiation, at the 
time this case was heard in the lower court, was attempting· to 
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determine the proper commission which would enable it to 
operate the vegetable department without profit or loss. 
The Petitioner is a purely non-profit co-operative purchas-
ing· association. It buys for and distributes to its members~ 
and only to its members-merchandise which is handled by 
the said members in the usual course of their business as re-
tail grocers. It does not buy for or sell or distribute to non-
members of the Association any merchandise whatsoever.· 
The by-laws of the Association provide that the right to pur-
chase throug·h the Association shall be limited to members and 
is not transferable and that no member shall be allowed or 
permitted to sell any merchandise purchased through the As-
sociation except in the regular course of his retail business, 
and that any member found g11ilty of selling goods purchased 
through the Association to non-members or otherwise dis-
posing of sueh merchandise, except in the regular course of 
his business, shall he subject to a fine for each separate viola: 
tion. This provision of the by-laws is strictly enforced.~(~., 
p. 60). 
Each member of the Association is a merchant and is liable 
for State and local retail merchant's license taxes and is re-
quired by law, in reporting his sales as a basis for detetmin-
ing his individual license taxes, to include the sales of all 
- merchandise purchased through the Petitioner. 
7* ·Immediately after its re-organization in April, 1937, 
counsel for the Petitioner consulted Honorable C. H. 
Morrissett. State Tax Commissioner of Virginia; with ref-
erence to the liability of the Petitioner for license taxes. 
Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Petitioner was 
not a merchant, and that it was not liable for any license 
taxes. The Commissioner ruled, however, that the Petitioner 
should be classified and taxed as a commission merchant 
under Section 17 4 of the Virginia Tax Code, which provides 
tlmt every person, firm or corporation ''buying· or selling'' 
for another any kind of merchandise on commission, except 
asRociations or organizations of farmers, including produce. 
exchan~:es organized and maintained by farmers in the mar-
keting of their produce and not for profit, shall be a commis-
sion merchant. Counsel for the Petitioner then consulted 
tl1e taxing authorities of the City of Richmond, who similarly 
ruled that the Petitioner was taxable as a commission mer-
clumt under the provisions of Section 86 of Chapter 10 of the 
Richmond City Code. which contains langua.ge practically 
identical with that of Section 174 of the Tax Code of Vir-
~·m1a. The Petitioner was thereupon a·ssessed with State 
and City commission merchant's license taxes for the year 
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1937 and has subsequently been regularly assessed with State 
and City commission merchant's license taxes for the years 
1938 and 1939, all of which taxes have been duly and regularly 
p~~. . 
There bas_ been no chang·e of the aforesaid ruling of the 
State T~x ·· Commissioner with reference to the Petitioner,. 
but the Ciey. authorities, notwithstanding the rulings in 1937, 
on April 1,6, 1939, assessed the Petitioner with city whole-
sale merchtmt 's license taxes for the years 1937, 1938 and 
1939, c1·editing the taxes thus assessed with the amounts 
8* paid by ~the Petitioner as city commission merchant's 
license taxes for each of the said years, thereby charging 
the Petitioner with the differences in the amounts of the 
said taxes, and adding· thereto penalties and interest for 
each of the years in question a~ hereinbef 01·e set forth in 
detail. ·wnereupon, the Petitioner filed its application for 
relief from, the taxes thus assessed, which relief was denied 
by the court. 
n3SIGNM:ENTS. OF ERROR. 
1. The conrt erred in rejecting ExMbits Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 12 
R on the ground that they were not material to the issues in 
the case (R., p. 18). 
2. The court erred in entering its order of May 9·, 1940, 
denying the application of the Petitioner for relief -.from the 
said assessments of city wholesale merchant's license taxes 
and penalties for the years 1937, 19'38 and 1939, made against 
it by the Commissioner of the Revenue of the City of Rich-
mond on April 15, 1939. · · 
THE ISSUE INVOLVED. 
The sole issne involved in this case is whether the Peti-
tioner should be classified and taxed as a wholesale merchant 
1mrler Section 121 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code, 
rather than as a commission merchant under Section 86 of 
Chapter 10 of said Code. 
The authenticity of the exhibits rejected by the court was 
admitted by counsel for the City of Richmond. The only 
question raised by the first assignment of error, therefore, 
is whether these exhibits are material to the issue in the 
case. The materiality of the exhibits will be plainly seen 
from the argument advanced on the main issue and no sepa-
rate argument on this assignment of error will be made. 
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9• *STATUTES AND ORDINANCES INVOLVED . 
.B,or the convenience of the Court, the portions of the stat-
utes of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the ordinances 
of the City of Richmond which are germane to the issue are 
set forth as follows: 
Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia: 
'' Sec. 3855. Cooperative associations.-Any number of 
persons not less than five may, under the provisions of this 
chapter, associate themselves together as a co-operative as-
sociation, society, company, or exchange, for the purpose of 
conducting any agricultural, dairy, mercantile, merchandise 
brokerage, mannf acturing·, or mechanical business on the co-
operative plan, and in addition,· to the information required 
to be set forth in its certificate of incorporation under sec-
tion thirty-eight hundred and fifty, the word 'co-operative' 
shall be a part of the name. · 
"The provisions of this chapter shall apply to co-opera-
tive associations created under this section, except so far as 
the same are in conflict with the following special provisions 
applicable only to sue.11 co-operative association: 
'' (a) No holder of common stock in any such association 
slmll own shares of a greater par value t.han one thousand 
dollars, except as hereinafter provided or :be entitled to more 
than one vote. · 
· '' (b) At any regular meeting or any regularly called spe-
cia 1 meeting at which at least a majority of all its stock-
holders shall be present or represented, such association may, 
by a majority vote of the stockholders present or repre-
sented. subscribe for shares and invest its capital or reserve 
fnnd in the capital stock of any corporation or co-operative 
association; provided. that it shall not so invest a total amount 
in excess of twenty-five per centum of the amount of its 
canital stock. 
" ( c) Whenever such association shall purchase the busi-
neRs of anotl1er association, person, or persons, it. may pa.y 
for the same in whole or in part by issuing to tl1e selling as-
Rocfr1tion or pe_rson, shares of its canit.al stock to an aµiount 
,vhicl1 at par -value woulcl enual the fair market value of the 
bui:dneRs so nnrchased. and in sueh case the transfer to the 
nsr.;oriation of su<-11 business flt such vahrntion slmll be equiva-
lent to payment in casl1 for the sl1ares of stock so issued. In 
cnse the cash value of such purcl1ased business exceeds one 
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thousand dollars, the directors of the association are au-
thorized to hold the shares in excess of one thousand dollars 
in trust for the vendor and dispose of the same to such per-
sons and within such time, as may be mutually satis-
10$; factory to the parties in *interest, and to pay the pro-
ceeds thereof as currently received to the former owners 
of said business. Certificates of stock shall not be issued to 
any subscriber until fully paid, !but the by-laws of the associa-
tion may allow subscribers to vote as stockholders; provided, 
part of the stock subscribed for has been paid in cash. , 
" ( d) The net earnings and profits shall be apportioned, 
distributed and applied as the association may at any gen-
eral or special meeting direct. The association may, in its 
by-laws, prescribe the terms aucl conditions, rules and regu-
lations under and by which the shareholders or employees, 
· or co-operating· non-shareholders may participate in the 
earnings of the association. 
"Unless and until otherwise ordered by the association at 
any general or special meeting the board of directors shall 
annually apportion the net earnings by first paying dividends 
on the paid-up capital stock not exceeding eight per centum 
per annum, and by then setting· aside not less than ten per 
centum of the remaining net earnings for a reserve fund until 
an amount has accumulated in said reserve fund equal to 
thirty per centum of the paid-up capital stock, and five per 
centum of the then remaining- net earnings for an educational 
fund to be used. in teaching co-operation; and shall appor-
tion tl1e remainder of said net profits by uniform dividends 
to its shareholders upon tl1e amount•of purchases of said as-= 
sociation from its shareholders, and sales by the association 
to its shareholders or for their account, and upon the wag·es 
and salaries of employees, and o_ne-half of such uniform divi-
dend to co-operating non-shareholders unless otherwise pro-
vided by the by-laws of said association as follows: If the 
associn.tion bP eng-aged in the mercantile business, then to 
the extent the business is so conducted, dividends, except M 
hereinafter otherwise provided, shall be paid to the co-opera-
tive non-sharel10lders and upon the a.mount of tlrnir purchases, 
and not upon the purchases made by the said association. 
If thP. · association be en~;aµ:ed to any extent in the purchase 
and sale of tlie products of farm or orchard or as selling 
agent of such products, or if the association ,ne a productivP 
M;sociation. such as a creamery, cannery, or factory, and the 
like. dividends to such extent slmll be nafd to the per~on~ 
so fnrnislling· sur.b products. a.nd upon the ·amounts so furJ 
nished. and not upon 'Sales by the association. 
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"(e) Any such association may, either in its chart~r or by-
laws, provide and require that no share of its stock shall be 
issued to or voted by any person not a member of a non-
stock corporation ~r non-stock corporations named or desig-
nated in such corporaUon or non-stock corporations named 
or designated in .r;uch charte1~ or by-laws, or may in like man-
ner provide that shares of its stock may be issued to or owned 
by persons not members of such designated non-stock cor-
poration or non-stock corporations, but that when so owned 
such stock shall have no voting power. 
11 • •" ( f) No corporation or association hereafter or-
ganized or doing business for profit in this Sta.te shall 
be entitled to use the term 'co-operative' as part of its cor-
porate or other business name or title unless it has, complied 
with the provisions of this section; and any corporation or 
association violating the provisions of this section .may be 
enjoined from doing business under such name at the in-
stance of any stockholder of .. any association legally organized 
hereunder. ' 
"(g) Any co-operative marketing association. or corpora-
tion incorporated under Chapter forty-eight, acts of General 
Assembly nineteen hundred and twenty-two, or under. the gen~ 
eral corporation laws of this State, may be brought under 
·the provisions of this act, and be entitled to all the benefit~ 
thereof, and ,be subject to all provisions, restrictions and lim.i-:-
tations thereof by ame~1di11g their articles of association or 
incorporation iu the same manner as set out in section twenty-
four, chapter forty-eight, acts of General Assembly nineteen 
hundred and twenty-two, in cases of such associations and 
corporations existing under chapter forty-eight, acts of As-
sembly nineteen hundred a.nd twenty-two, either by original 
incorporation or by amendment, a.-r1d in cases of ·such as-
sociations and corporations existing under the general cor-
poration laws by amending according to the provisions of 
section thirty-seven hundred and eighty, Code of Virginia 
nineteen hundred and nineteen; hut when such amendment 
is had in the. case of a corporation or association existing un-
der provisions of chapter forty-eig;ht, acts of Assembly nine-
teen hnnih-~d nnd twenty-two, all special privileges up.der 
chapter forty-eig·ht, acts of Assembly nineteen hundred and 
twenty-two, are thereby surrendered." 
Rection 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia: 
'' Sec. 188. Merchants--Wholesale.-Every person, firm and 
corporation en11i·aged in tl1e business of a wholesale merchant 
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shall pay a license tax for the privilege of doing business in 
this .State to be measured by the amount of purchases made 
by him or it during the next preceding year, and all goods, 
wares and merchandise manufactured by such wholesale mer-
chant and .spld or offered for sale, in this State, as merchan-
dise!' shall be considered as purchases within the meaning of 
this sectioTu; .provided, that this section shall not be construed 
as applyingJ to manufacturers taxed on capital by this State, 
who offer :fio).·. sale at the place of manufacture, goods, wares 
and merchandise manufactured by them. 
"The term 'wholesale merchant', as used in this section, 
means every merchant who sells to other persons for resale 
only, or who sells to institutional, conunercial or industrial 
users. 
'' },or every license to a person, firm or corporation engaged 
in the business of a wholesale merchant, the amount to be 
paid shall be as follows: 
12~ ~,'If the amount of purchases throughout the then 
next preceding· calendar year did not exceed ten thou-
sand dollars, the amount shall be fifty dollars; when such 
purchases exceeded ten thousand doilars, the amount shall be 
fifty dollars on the first ten thousand dollars, and thirteen 
cents on every one hundred dollars upon all in excess of ten 
thousand dollars. 
'' To ascertain tlie amount of purchases it shall be the duty 
of snch wholesale merchant, on the first day of January of 
each year, or within ten days thereafter, to make report in 
writing, under oath, to the commissioner of the revenue for 
the county or city in which is located his place of business 
showing- purchases as herein defined, during the next pre-
ceding calendar year. The forms of the reports required by 
this section shall ,be prepared by the Department of Taxa-
tion. and furnished to each commissioner of the revenue, 
and by him distributed among all wholesale merchants within 
his connty or city." 
Section 17 4 of the Tax Code of Virginia: 
''Sec. 174. Commission merchants, and brokers.-Every 
person. firm or corporation, doing business in this s·tate who 
receives or distributes provisions and merclianclise, includ-
in~ flour, hay or g-rain, shipped to such person, firm or cor-
poration for distribution on account of the shipper, or who 
narticinates in the profits, ensuing from or accruing out of 
the sales of such provisions or merchandise, including flour, 
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hay or grain, or who invoices such sales ori collects the money 
therefor, shall be deemed to be a broker who receives or 
distributes provisio1is and merchandise, including flour, hay, 
or g-rain. . 
'' Every person, firm or corporation, buying or selling for 
another any kind of merchandise, on commission, except as-
sociations or organizations of farmers, ineluding produce 
exchanges, organized and maintained by farmers for mutual 
help in the marketing of their produce and not for profit, 
shall be a commission merchant. Any person, firm or cor-
poration licensed as a commission merchant may sell any 
personal property which may be left with, or consigned to 
him for sale, except gold or silver coin, bonds, certificates of 
public or private debts or other securities; provided, how-
ever. that any such merchant may sell gold or silver coin, 
certificates of public or private debts or other securities, by 
taking out the license therefor prescribed in the case of stock 
brokers. 
'' Every person, firm or corporation shall pay for the privi-
lege of transacting the business of a commission merchant 
or broker the sum of :fifty dollars, provided the commissions 
for the preceding year did not exceed one thousand dollars, 
but when the commissions exceeded one thousand dollars, 
the tax shall be fifty dollars, and an additional tax at the 
rate of one dollar for 0ach hundred dollars, or fraction 
thereof, of commissions in excess of one thousand dollars, 
and if the license is to include the privileg·e of selling gold 
or silver coins, bonds, certificates of public or private 
13* ,..debts, or other securities, there shall be paid, in addi-
tion. the amounts required in each case to be paid by 
stock brokers and in like manner. 
"The license tax on everv commission merchant or broker 
beg·inning business shall be the flat tax above prescribed, plus 
a tax in accordance with the fore going scale measured by the 
commiRRions which it is estimated he will receive from the 
time be commences business to t]1e following December thirty-
first.'' 
Rectiou 121 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code: 
'' 121. MER.CHANTS-,Vllolesale.-( a) Every person, 
firm and corporation engaged in the business of a wholesale 
merchant shall obtain a license for the privilege of doing busi-
11eRR in the City of Richmond and sha]l pay a license tax 
therefor to be measured .lJy the amount of purchases made 
by him or it during· the preceding license year. The term 
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'wholesale merchant' as used in this seetion means every 
mercha~t ,.who sells to others for resale only, and a sepa-
rate license shall be obtained for each definite place of busi-
ness. 
"(b) For every license issued to a person, firm or corpora-
tion engaged in the business of a wholesale merchant, the 
amount of license tax to be. paid therefor shall be as follows: 
'' If the amount of purchases throughout the then next 
preceding license year did not exceed two thousand dollars, 
the amount shall be twenty dollars ( $20.00) ; when such pur-
chases exceeded two thousand dollars, the amount shall be 
twenty dol!ars ($20.00) on the first two thousand dollars and 
twenty-two cents (22c) on every one hundred dollars upon 
all purchases in excess of two thousand dollars. Not pro-
rated. 
'' ( c) The word 'purchases' as used in this section shall be 
construed to include all g·oods, wares and merchandise re-
ceived for sale at each definite place of business of every 
wholesale merchant, and shall not be construed to exclude 
any goods, wares and merchandise otherwise coming within 
the meaning of the word. * * * 
* * 
" ( e) To ascertain the amount of purchases it shall be the 
duty of each wholesale merchant, on the first day of J anu-
a ry of each year, or within ten days thereafter, to make re-
port in writing·, under oath, to the commissioner of the reve-
nue. showing· purchases as defined in this section during the 
next preceding license yem·. The form of the report required 
by this section shall be prepared by the city comptroller and 
furnished to the commissioner of the revenue, and by him 
distributed among- all wholesale merchants within the city of 
Richmond; provided, however, that when a wholesale mer-: 
chant reports his purchases on forms prepared by the 
14~ State as a, basis *for the assessment of bis State license 
tax. such report may constitute a compliance with the 
pTovisions of this sub-section when a true copy thereof is 
furnished by the wholesale merchant to the commissioner 
of the rev:enue.'' 
Section 86 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City -Code: 
''86. COl\fl\USSION :MERCHANTS.-Persons. ·firms or 
corporations who receive or distribute food products, cotton, 
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flour, hay, grain provisions, dry goods~ merchandise or other 
commodities shipped to such person, firm or corporation for 
distribution on account of the shipper, or who participate in 
the profits ensuing from or accruing out of the sale of such 
commodities, or who invoice such sales or collect money 
therefor; and every person, firm or corporation buying or 
selling for another any kind of merchandise or commodities, 
on commission, except associations or organizations of farm-
ers, and produce exchanges organized and maintained by 
farmers for mutual help in the marketing of their produce 
and not for profit; and any person, firm. or corporation who· 
sells any personal property which may be, left with or con-
sig·ned to him £or sale on commission t!= ~ * $50.00 and $2.50 
iJer $1,000.00 on all gToss earnings, receipts or commissions 
for the preceding license year in excess of $1,000.00. Not pro-
t·a ted. '' 
ARGUMEJ\TT. 
In Geneml .. 
Petitioner desires to make it plain at the beginning of this 
argument that it does not claim exemption from State or 
local taxation. The question involved is solely one of proper 
classification under the sta.tutes of the Commonwealth of 
Vir~inia and the ordinances of the Citv of Richmond. 
Petitioner does contend that the natui·e of its organization 
and its metl10ds of operation are such that it is doubtful 
whether under the .laws it is subject to any State or city 
license tax. This question was raised with the St.ate and 
city faxing· authorities in 1937 when Petitioner was organized 
under tl1e provisions of Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia, 
hut when the State Tax Commissioner ruled that ·Petitioner 
sl1ould be classified ancl taxed as a commission merchant, the 
City authorities concurred with him. Petitione1"\ acquiesced 
in the ruling and was for several years thereafter assessed 
accordingly by both the State and the city and has 
15* •regularly paid the taxes tlms assessed against it as a 
commission merchant since its· org·anization. 
Petitioner admits that there are substantial grounds to 
support its classification as a commission merchant but sub-
mits tliat the proposal of the ·Cit.v of Richmond to classify it 
11s a wholesale merchant is wholly unsupported by the law, 
facts or reason. 
One of the chief economic problems of the United States 
for a number of years has been that of providing a more ef-
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ficient and economical system for the distl'ibution of mer-
chandise, _particularly food products. It has -Jong been recog-
nized that-the existing system is expensive and wasteful and 
results in .air unconscionable spread between the price paid 
the producex and that charged the consumer. This spread 
has resulted 'in large measure from the fact that the products 
pass through an unreasonable number of so-called middle 
men, each of whom exacts bis profit and many of whom have 
become so large and powerful that they can control the mar-
kets and fix the prices both for tlle producer and the con-
sumer. 
The agricultural interests have suffered particularly under 
this system because of the fact that the individual farmer is 
forced to sell his produce on the market at a price fixed by 
the purchaser and buy his supplies on the market at a price 
:fixed by the seller. The cooperative marketing and purchas-
ing statutes enacted by the Cong'l'ess of the United .States 
and by the several States of the Union are designed and have 
served to remedy this situation. By pooling· their interests 
in cooperative marketing associations, producers have suc-
ceeded in eliminating some of the unnecessary middle men 
and in maintaining more satisfactory market prices; bv or-
ganizing co-operative purchasing associations, they ·have 
been able to eliminate the profits .of unnecessary middle . 
16* men, buy in larg·er *quantities and thereby secure more 
favorable prices on their supplies. 
The co-operative movement has spread more rapidly among 
the agricultural ~Toups but it has not been limited to those 
groups. Other fields of enterprise have suffered similar con-
ditions and have sought similar remedies. In the ,field of 
merchandising, numerous approaches have been made to the 
problem of reducing the number of middle men and thereby 
reducing· the spread in prices between producer and consumer. 
One of the major developments l1as been the advent and 
growth of the chain store, which has contributed to the solu-
tion of the general problem but has brought with it attend-
ant evils regarded by many as more serious than the origfaal 
condition. · · 
Quantity purchasing, the cash and carry system and other 
factors have made it impossible for the small independent 
local merchants to compete with the gigantic chains and they 
are being· g-radually eliminated as a part of our economic 
structure. Co-operative purchasing is one of the most ef-
fective means which the small independent merchants have 
found to meet this competition. By purchasing through their 
own co-operative associations they buy in larger quantities 
and at more favorable prices and eliminate the wholesalers' 
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pro.fit, which enables them to sell their merchandise on a com-
petitive basis with the chain stores. -
Whether the concentration of the mercantile business in a 
few large corporations is economic progress may well be ques-
tioned. Legislation designed to curtail chain stores' activi-
ties has been enacted in a number of States. Such legisla: 
tion, although frequently proposed in Virginia, has not been 
adopted. The General Assembly has, however, recognized 
tho merits of the co-operative movement and has enacted Sec-
tion 3855 of the Code of Virginia for the protection and 
preservation of small, independent business enterprises. 
17* This statute embraces the same basic *principles as 
those found in the Co-operative Marketing Act and 
should be construed in conformity with the decisions touching 
Ruch legislation. 
The principles of co-operative marketing and purchasing 
are now well established. Legislation desig·ned to encourage 
and promote the expansion and growth of the co-operative 
movement has been enacted by the Federal Government and 
by practically all of the States. The courts have recognized 
the underlying purposes of the movement and have sought 
to effectuate the accomplishment of those purposes by liberal 
constructions and broad interpretations of the statutes, and 
certain well defined principles pertinent to the discussion of 
the issue in this case haye become well established by numer-
ous court decisions from all sections of the United States. 
Petitioner ls Not am, Ord:inary Bus-iness Corporation and 
Should Not Be Considered and Treqted as Such. 
The Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of 
various States have recognized that the distinctions. between 
co-operative associations and ordinary business organizatio11s 
nre such as to justify different treatment under the laws. 
In the case of U. 8. v. Rock Boval Co-op., Inc., et al. (1939), 
307 U.S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446, the Court, 
at page 562, said : 
'' The general characteristics of co-operatives are well un-
derstood. The Capper-Volstead Act defines such co-opera-
tives as associations of producers, corporate or otherwise, 
with or ,vithout capital stock, marketing their product for 
the mutual benefit of the members as producers with equal 
voting privileges, restricted dividends on capital employed 
and dealings limited to 50 per cent non-member products. 
Different treatment has been accorded marketing co-ope1:a-
. tives by state and Federal legislation alike. '*' * ,x, These ag-
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ricultural co-operatives are the means by which farmers 
18w and stockmen enter· into the processing *and distribu-
tion of their crops and live stock. The distinctions be-
tween such co-operatives and business organizations have re-
peatedly been held to justify different treatment." 
- The Court the1i cites several decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States and numerous State decisions approv-
ing· the special advantages given co-operatives. 
Although the -Court in the Rock Royal Co-op. ease ref erred 
to produc.er co-operatives and most of the decisions cited by 
the Court deal with such co-operatives, in Virginia, as we 
have heretofore pointed out, Section 3855 of the Code em-
braces the same basic principles as those found in the Co-
operative Marketing Act and the decisions are, therefore, con-
trolling in the instant case. The distinctions between co-op-
eratives and business org·anizations upon which the various 
decisions are based consh;t of certain fundamental differences 
in organization and operation, all of which exist in the Peti-
tioner's case. The prime motive of an ordinary business 
organization is profit; Petitioner is a non-profit association. 
Its charter specifically provides that its purposes are to be 
carried out on a non-profit basis in the interest of the mcm"'.' 
hers of the Association in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia ( Exhibit 11). .1:\. busi-
ness organization deals with the public generally; Petitioner 
deals only with its members. A business corporation is owned 
and controlled by its stockholders, to whom the profits of the 
corporation are di;,tributecl as dividends; the ownership and 
control of Petitioner is in the bands of its members, each of 
whom has one vote, regardless of the amount of stock held. 
Althoug·h Code Section 3855 re:iuires the issuance of capital 
stock, the stock carries no voting privileges, no dividends 
whatever are paid upon it and, in the case of dissolution, 
19* the stock participates only to the extent of its ,.,par value. 
Without voting power and without dividends the stock 
has practically no value and serves merely as a prerequisite 
to membership in the Association. The aniount of stock which 
mav be held and the transfer of s.tock are limited hy char-
ter~ No share of stock is owned by a non-member of the As-
sociation and no member owns more than the five shares re-
qufred as a prerequisite to membership. Business 01~g·aniza-
. tions sell at a price to obtain the greatest margin of profit 
the market will afford; Petitioner buys for and distributes 
to its members on a 4% commission. which it estimates is 
. the amom1t necei;;sary to take care of its cost of _operation. 
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If this amount is in excess of its cost of operation, the over-
charge is distributed to its members in proportion to their 
purchases through the Association. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has, however, specifically 
recognized the difference between a co-operative association 
and an ordinary business corporation by the enactment of 
Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia. .Surely there could be 
no reason for the enactment of this statute unless associations 
organized thereunder are to have a different classification 
from corporations organized under Seetion 3849 of the Code, 
which provides for the organization of ordinary business cor-
}JOrations. The Legislature, recog·nizing that there are funda-
mental differences between the two classe~ of organizations, 
has provided separate laws for their creation, under which 
the status of each is to be determined. 
It must be admitted that in some instances associations 
have organized under the Co-operative Associations Act and 
under the Co-operative Marketing Act and have abused the 
privileges conferred upon, them by dealing generally with 
the public and engaging in activities not contemplated by the 
law. Such associations have been co-operative in name 
20* only. They *have used the co-operative statutes as a 
subterfuge under which they have operated· ordinary 
business enterprises. 
This certainly has not been true in the case of the Peti-
tioner. Its books have been examined and its activities in-
spected by representa.tives of the Comptroller's Office of the 
City of Richmond, and not one single deviation from the 
co-operative principle has been found. Not one piece of mer-
chandise is sold or distributed to non-members of the Asso-
ciation. The only commodities handled are those required 
bv its members in the usual course of their business as re-
tail grocers. No profits are earned by the Association and 
no dividends are distributed on its stock. Any sm·pluses are 
treated as overcharges on the goods purchased through the 
Association and are distributed among· its members in pro-
portion to their purchases. These distributions, sometimes 
referred to as patronag·e dividends, are in no sense profits of 
the corporation. See Gallatin Fanners Co. v. ShClllvnon 
( 1939), . . . . Mont. . ... , 93 P. ( 2d) 953, and decisions of 
the United States Board of Tax Appeals referred to therein. 
Counsel for the Petitioner respectfully challenge the City 
of Richmond to find a more purely co-operative enterprise 
within the confines of the entire United States. 
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Petitione1: Is Not a Merchant and Shoitld Not Be Taxed as 
· Such. 
The law is·well settled in the United States by numerous 
decisions that the relationship between a co-operative associa-
tion and its members is that of principal and agent or trus-
tee and beneficiarv and not that of vendor and venclee. 
21~ *In Kansa.r; Wheat Growers' Ass'n v. Board of C01n'rs. 
of Sedgwick County, et al. (1925), 119 Kan. 877, 241 P. 
466, an attempt was made to tax as a merchant a non-profit 
co-operative marketing association. The Court, in holding 
that the association was not a merchant, said: 
"Tl1e relation of the association and its members looked 
at broadly, seeking· the real intention of the parties to the 
arrangement as gathered from the contracts as a whole. con-
sidered in connection with the statute, is not that of buyer 
and seller. The association has indeed a legal entity o( its 
own; it is a corporation, but not a corporation for gain; it 
may make and enforce contracts with its own members and 
with others; it may buy and sell, sue and be sued. But it 
seeks no profit for itself. It is a mere instrument through 
which the members undertake by concerted action to market 
their own crops. The members do not barg·ain with it over 
prices. The bond of membership· binds each to the others 
to sell only through it, for in no other ,vay can co-operation 
be enforced. The members are the association in a fuller 
sense than the stockholders of a corporation having capital 
stock are tl1e company. The rights acquired by the association 
with respect to the wheat are held for the benefit of its mem-
bers. They are the real owners, while it has possession, con-
trol, and the power of sale, exclusive and irrevocable.'' 
In Citv of Owensboro, et al., v. Dark Tobacco Growers 
Ass'n .. (1927), 222 Ky. 164, 300 iS. w·. 350, the Court held that 
the relationship between a co-operative tobacco marketing- a~-
sociation· and its members ,yas that of principal and agent, 
hv virtue of which tobacco in the association's hands was ex-
empt from local taxation under a statute which exempted "un-
manufactured agricultural products in tl1e hands of the pro-
ducer or in the hands of any agent or agency of the pro-
ducer to which said products have been conveyed or assigned 
for the plll"pose of sale by the producer''. 
The following quotation from the opinion of the court shows 
that its decision was prompted by considerations which ex-
ist in the instant case : 
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''In this case the a'3sociation not only was the creature of 
the growers, but by its charter it had no right to make a pro.fit 
out of the handling or sale of their products. The whole e-011-
ception of the organization was that it was a marketing as-
sociation created and organized for the purpose *of ad-
221.t vantageous marketing of the growers' produc.t, not 
for the benefit of the association, but for the benefit of 
its members, who were all either growers or landlords. 
'' A consideration of these facts makes it impossible that 
the parties could have had in mind any other thing than the 
creating of a sales agency in the execution of the several con-
tracts. 22 R. C. L., p. 21G; 2 C. J ., pp. 420, 421; H aarpar-inne 
v. Bu,tter Hill Fruit Growers' Association, 122 :Me. 138, 119 
A. 116." 
In Ya.ldm,a, Fr-wit Growers Ass'n., et al., v. llenneford, et a,l. 
(19B5), 182 ·wash. 437, 47 P. (2d) 831, 100 A. L. R. 435, the 
Court held that a corporation organized by fruit growers,to 
assist them in the producing·, packing·, warehousing·, and sale 
of their fruit under a non-profit arrangement, stock being 
owned by the producers and a few former producers, and the 
proceeds after sale and the payment of expenses being dis-
tributed on a pro rata basis according to fruit handled throug·h 
the corporation, was merely acting as agent of the producers, 
and henco was exempt from an occupational tax under an ex-
emption accorded persons engaged in the business of growing 
for sale, profit, or use, any agricultural or horticultural prod-
uct. · 
The following quotation from the court's well reasoned 
opinion is particularly pertinent to the facts in Petitioner's 
case: 
'' The respondents cite a number of cases holding the re-
la t.ionship between members of co-operative associations and 
the corporations to be that of agency, and this appears to be 
the generally accepted rule with reference to sucl1 organiza .. 
tions. There is some simila ritv between the methods of do-
ing· business by the co-operative associations and the method~ 
of doing business by the respondents. 
"No case has been called to our attention which has dis-
cussed or decided the precise question here for determina-
tion. If one individm1l grower produced, packed, warehoused 
and sold his crop, it would hardly be contended that he did 
11ot come within the exception of the statute. If two or more 
should pool their crops, a11cl co-operate in the packing·, V\"are-
housing·, and selling, the situation would not be different from 
that of the individual grower. ·The evidence in this 
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23* «'case shows that there are in the Yakima Valley a num-
ber of large producers who individually do all of these 
thing·s for themselves, and they, of course, would not be un-
der the act. "'\Ve see no reason for holding that, because a 
large number of producers, most of whom are not what would 
he called large producers, cause a corporation to be organized 
for the purpose of assisting them in the production, pack-
ing, warehousing, and sale, they should not be on the same 
basis as a producer indiviqually, whethei· large or small, or 
two or more persons co-operating together by joint enterprise 
-rather than by corporate entity. The fact that they operate 
through a corporate entity in which they own the stock and the 
corporation makes no profit and distributes the proceeds 
after a sale and the payment of the expenses 011 a pro rata per 
box basis does not put them in a materially different situa-
tion than if two or more of them co-operated simply as mem-
bers of a joint undertaking· without corporate existence. The 
fact that a certain percentage of the members of the corpora-
tion are not producers, owing to the fact that they had sold 
their orchard land, is merely incidental, and is not of con-
trolling importance. In any reasonable sense, the respond-
ents, as corporations, are not engaged in business for profit, 
and, in fact, thoy do not make any. ,They are merely the 
agents of their stockholders, the producePs, and are not, as 
already indi~ated, independent contractors.'' 
See also Ha.arpa.rinne v. Butter HiU Fru,it Growers Asso. 
(1922), 122 l\fe. 138, 119 Atl. 116; Johnson v. Staple Cotton, 
(!o-op. Ass'n. (1926), 142 Miss. 312, 107 S. 2; Mountain States 
Beet Growers .1.l!/arketin,q Asso. v. Monroe (1928), 84 Colo. 
• 300, 269 P. 886; Georgia Milk Producers Confederation v. 
City of Atlanta (1937), 185 Ga. 192, 194 S. E. 181; City of 
Atlanta, et al., v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation 
(1938), 187 Ga. 117, 200 S. E. 712; Baker v. Glenn (1933), 2 
F. Supp. 880; Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co; (1930), 245 
N. Y. Supp. 32, aflirmed (1.931), 256 N. Y. 559, 177 N. E. 
140; Re,inert v. California Almond Growers Excha-izge, et al. 
(1937), 9 Cal. (2d) 181, 70 P. (2d) 190; Kelowna Growers 
l!Jxch. v. De Caqueray (1922), .... B. C ..... , 70 D. L. R. 
865. 
Although all of the decisions cited above relate to co-op-
erative marketing associations, it is respectfully sub-
24* mitted that the principle *enunciated is equally ap-
plicable to a. co-operative purchasing· association. A co-
operative marketing association acts as agent in selling for 
its members; a co-operative purchasing association acts as 
agent in buying· for its members. Their basic principles _of 
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organization and operation are the same. The decisions are 
particularly applicable to Petitioner, as the Commonwealth 
of Virgfoia has provided by special statute for the creation 
of co-operative purchasing associations in substantially the 
same manner as for the creation of co-operative marketing 
associations. 
Moreover, the statutes of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
and the ordinances of the City of H.ichmond recog·nize that a 
co-operative association is not a merchant and should not be 
taxed as such. The word "merchant" is not defined in either 
the State or City Code. Section 188 of the Tax Code of Vir-
ginia and Section 121 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City 
Code provide that every person, firm or corporation engaged 
in the business of a wholesale merchant shall obtain a license 
and pay a certain specified tax. The term "wholesale mer-
chant" is defined in the State law as every "merchantn who 
sells to other persons for resale only, or who sells to institu-
tional, commercial or industrial users. In the City Code the 
term ~'wholesale merchant" is defined as everv "merchant" 
who sells to others for resale only. ~ 
In Section 194 of the State Tax Code, which prescribes a 
State license tax on commission merchants and brokers, and 
in Section 86 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code, which 
prescribes a city license tax on commission merchants, the 
term ''commission merchant'' is defined and the language is . 
practically the same in both sections. The definition appear-
ing- in Section 86 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City Code is· 
as follows: · 
25* *" * * * and every person, firm or corporation buy-
ing or selling for another any kind of merchandise or 
commodities, on commission, except associations or or,qruiiza-
tions of farmers, and produce ex.changes organized a.nd main-
tained by farmers for 1nutual help in tlw marketin,q of thefr 
vroduce amd not for profit,· and any person, firm or corpora-
tion who sells any personal property which may be left with 
or consig'Iled to him for sale on commission ........ $50.00 
and $2.50 per $1,000.00 on all gross earnings, receipts or com-
missions for the preceding license year in excess 0£ $1,000.00.'' 
(Italics supplied.) 
The italicized portion of the section which is almost identi-
cal with a similar provision appearing· in the State law ap-
plies to co-operative assoeiat.ions and is a recognition of the 
fact that such associations, unless expressly exempt from the 
sections, would be taxable as commission merchants. Farm 
co-operative marketing associations are expressly exeri1pted 
I 
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from the tax, which leaves all other co-operative associations 
taxable thereunder. 
Petitioner is a corporation buying for its members mer-
chandise on a com.mission of four per cent. If, therefore, it is 
liable for a license tax at all, it is taxable as a commission 
merchant under the express terms of Section 194 of the State 
Tax Code and Section 86 of Chapter 10 of the Richmond City 
Code. 
This was the interpretation placed upon the sections by the 
State Tax Commissioner and the Richmond City taxing au-
thorities in 1937, nnd accepted by the Petitioner, who has since 
regularly paid' his taxes in accordance therewith. It ·is re-
spectfully submitted that it is a correct interpretation. Cer-
tainly, as a practical construction adopted by executive offi-
cers of the State and city, it is entitled to great considera-
tion by the court, and in case of doubt is fairly entitled to 
tum the scale in the judicial mind. City of Richmond v. Drew-
ry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, at p. 193, 94 S. E. 989. 
26* *This is not a cnse of a corporation engaging in busi-
ness and at the same time seeking to avoid liability for 
taxation. 
It is rather a case of an association quite properly objecting 
to the arbitrary action of the City in reversing its previous 
tax classification decision and arbitrarily undertaking· to 
transfer the association retroactivelv to anotl1er and more 
burdensome tax classification. The City itself, by its legis-
lative body, has created these separate tax classifications. 
Obviously Petitioner's character and operations more nearly 
fit the definition of '' commission merchant'' than anv other 
classification. The correctness of this position was'" recog-
nized for several years by the tax assessment and enforce-
ment officers of the city. Subsequently, without any change 
whatever in the tax ordinance or classiifications and without 
any change whatever in the status or clml'acter of Petitioner's 
operations, the City arbitrarily undertalnfa to transfer Pe-
titioner away from the tax classification theretofore agreed 
upon into a broader classification manifestly not intended 
for organizations of Petitioner's type. And,-worst of aU,-
the city also undertakes to make this arbitrary reclassifi-
cation retroactive for several years, adding interest and pen-
alties to boot. The record is a hsolutely devoid of any sound -
reason or justification for such action. The only motive wllich 
can be surmised for the city's action is a desire to increase 
its revenues. 1Vhilc such increase ma-~r be CJUite desirable, 
perhaps, from the ·City's standpoint, it certainly cannot con-
stitute any leg-al foundation for assessing- Petitioner with an 
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additional tax burden not warranted by law or justified by 
reason. 
27* *To permit the City of Richmond at this late date 
to reopen the entire question and assess the Petitioner 
retroactively for the years 1937, 1938 and HJ39 under an en-
tirely ·different classification, with an increased tax, adding 
thereto penalties and interest for non-payment, would work 
a hardship which cannot be justified in law or in the forum 
of public conscience. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that Petitioner 
has been correctly assessed and has properly paid its taxes 
as a commission merchant under Section 86 of Chapter 10 
of the Richmond City Code for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939; 
that Petitioner is not a mernhant and was not liable for a 
wholesale merchant's license tax for the said years 1937, 
1938 and 1939; und that the subsequent assessment of the 
aforesaid wholesale merchant's license taxes made ag·ainst the 
Petitioner by the City of Richmond for the said years is, 
therefore, arbitrary, errnneous and illegal. 
·wherefore, your Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ 
of error be awarded to it, that the decision of the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond herein complained of be re-
viewed and reversed, and that judgment be entered by this 
Court in accordance with the principles herein advanced, de-
claring the aforesaid a~sessment of city wholesale merchant's 
license taxes for the years 1937, 19'38 and 1939 made by the 
Commissioner of the Re,~enuo of the City of Richmond on 
April 15, 1939, against your Petitioner, erroneous, illegal, 
null and void, and correcting and annulling the same and ex-
onerating the Petitioner from the payment of the taxes 
charg·ed thereby. Your Petitioner also prays that this petition 
be taken as its brief, for which it is intended. 
28* * And your Petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
Copies of this petition were delivered to the City At-
torney of Richmond, Virginia, on the 7th day of September, 
1940, and opportunit? is requested to state orally the reasons 
for reviewing the order complained of in accordance with the 
rules of the Court. This petition will be filed with the Clerk 
of the Court at Richmond. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHMOND FOOD STORES, INCORPORATED, 
By J. VAUGH.AN GARY, 
JOHN .T. vVICKE,R, JR., 
Its Attorneys. 
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I, J. Vaughan Gary, an attorney qualified to practice in 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, with offices in the 
State-Planters Bank Building, Richmond, Virginia, do cer-
tify that, in my opinion, the order complained of oug·ht to be 
reviewed and reversed by this Court. 
J. VAUGHAN GARY. 
Richmond, Virg·inia, September 7, 1940. 
Received September 7, 1940. 
M. B. ,;v:ATTS, Clerk. 
Oct. 17, 1940. Writ of error and supersedeas· awarded by. 




001\fMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
City of Richmond, to-~it: 
M. B. W. 
Pleas at the Cqurthouse of the City of Richmond, in the 
City Hall, before the Hustings Court of the said City, on 
the 27th day of June, 1940. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 7th day 
of June, 1939, Richmond Food .Stores, Incorporated, Peti-
tioner, filed an Application for correction of erroneous as-
sessments of City wholesale merchants license taxes for the 
years 1937, 1938 and 1939, against the City of Richmond, 
which application is in the words and figures following, to-
wit: 
page 2 ~ Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
Richmond Food Stores, Iiicorporated, 
v. 
City of Ricl1mond. 
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APPLICATION. 
To the Honorable John L. Ingram, Judge of the said Court: 
The Applicant, Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, a co-
operative association organized and existing under the pro-
visions of Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia, known as 
the Co-Dperative Association Act, respectfully represents to 
the Court that it is aggrieved by erroneous assessments of 
eity license taxes made by the Commissioner of the Revenue 
of the City of Richmond on April 15, 1939, whereby it is er-
roneously charged with city wholesale merchant's license 
























The said Applicant hereby applies for relief from the afore-
said erroneous assessments and, in support of its application, 
presents to the Court the following case: 
1. The Applicant is an association composed of 144 retail 
grocers whose places of business are located in the City of 
rlichmond and vicinity. The organization was formed by the 
retail grocers as a co-operative buying· organization to en-
able the small retail stores to buy collectively and thereby to 
o'btain the advantage of purchasing their merchandise in large 
quantities, so as to me~t the competition of the large chain 
stores which threatens the existence of the smaller independ-
ent merchant. 
page 3 ~ 2. When the Association was first organized it 
obtained a charter under Chapter 151 of the Code 
of Virgfoia as a ·non-stock non-profit organization and op-
erated as such for several years. Since, however, its organiza-
tion was, in fact, a co-operative association, and the General 
.· Assembly of Virginia had specifically provided for the in-
corporation of co-operative associations under Section 3855 
of the Code of Virgfoia, and its purposes and operations con-
formed more closely to the provisions of Section 3855 of the 
Code of Virginia than to the provisions of Chapter 151 of 
the Code of Virginia, the Association subsequently deter-
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mined to re-organize under Section 3855 of the Code of Vir-
ginia. 
3. On .April 28, 1937, the non-stock corporation was dis-
solved and the Applicant was incorporated as a co-operative 
association under the provisions of Section 3855 of the Code 
of Virgini?,~ _ Although the said Section 3855 provides that 
the word ~'co-operative'' shall be a part of the name of any 
association incorporated thereunder, the State Corporation 
Commiss1on would not permit the use of the word '' co-op-
erative'' as a part of the name of the Applicant, because of 
the fact that Section :21 of the Co-Operative Marketing Act 
enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia subsequent to 
Section 3855 of the Code prohibits the use of the word "co-
operative" as a part of the name of any association other 
than a co-operative marketing association organized under 
the provisions of said Act. 
4. The Applicant's corporate organization and operations 
conform in every detail to the provisions of Section 3855 of 
the Code of Virginia. .Although the said Section requires. 
the issuance of stock, the stock issued by the Applicant has 
practically no value other than that of providing the prereq-
uisite required for membership in the Association. When 
the Applicant first re-organized, the ownership of three shares 
of stock was required as a prerequisite to membership. This 
requirement has subsequently been increased to the owner-
ship _of five shares of stock. The said shares of stock entitle 
the owner to no voting privileges in the management of the 
affairs of the Assor.iation. No dividends are declared or paid 
on the stock and, in the event of liquidation or dissolution of 
the Association, the stockholders participate in the distribution 
of its assets only to the extent of the par value of the stock. 
No shares of stock haye been issued to or are owned 
page 4 ~ by others than members of the Association, and no 
member of the .Association owns more than the num-
ber of shares required to qualify for membership. There are 
at the present time 484 shares of stock issued and outstand-
ing, all of which are owned and held by the 144 members of 
the Association. The transfer of the stock is restricted by 
the charter, which provides that whenever any stockl10lder 
desires to sell his stock, he shall first offer it to the Associa-
tion for purchase by the Association, or by a person or per-
sons designated by the board of directors of the Association 
at a fair price to be conclusively determined by the boa rd of 
directors, which price shall in no event exceed the par value 
of the said stock. 
5. Voting· power in the Association is vested by its charter 
in its members, each of whom is entitled to one and only 
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one vote, regardless of the number of shares of stock he may 
own in the .Association. Although the Association does not 
attempt to operate at a profit, in the event any surplus re-
sults from its operation, such surplus is distributed under 
its by-laws to the -members of the Association on a patron-
age basis in proportion to the business done by each member 
with and through the Association, and in the event any deficit 
results from its operations, such dc,ficit is similarly dis-
tributed. Its cha.rter provides that, in the event of any liqui-
dation or dissolution or winding- up (whether voluntary or 
involuntary) of the Association, then, after the payment of 
all debts of the Association, the remaining assets, if any, shall 
he divided between the stock]1olders in proportion to the 
amount of stock held by each, hut not to exceed the par value 
of such stock; the then remaining assets, if any, shall be di-
vided behveen the members of the Association in proportion 
to the amount of business done with or throug·h the Associa-
tion. 
6. The charter of the Association provides that its purposes 
are to be carried out on a non-profit basis in the interest of 
the members of the Association, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 3855 of the Code of Vi rgfoia, and tl1e As-
sociation operates accorcling·ly. Pm;t experience has shown 
that its cost of operation is approximately 4% of the purchase 
price of the merchandise bought for its members. The As-
sociation, thel'efore, operates on a 4% mark-up on 
page 5 ~ all g·oods distributed to its members. This per-
centage of mark-up is uniformly applied to all mer-
chandise except vcg·etables. The Association did not handle 
vegetables prior to March of this year, but during that month 
a vegetable department was installed. Obviously, by reason 
uf the highly perjshnhle nature of veg·etables, tl}e mark-up 
thereon will have to he larger tlrnn on less perishable mer-
chandise to cover loss<.ls aml the Association is now attemp~-
in~· to determine the percentage of mark-up which will enable: 
it to operate ·the ve~;etahle department without profit or loss. 
7. The Applicant is a purely non-profit co-opet·ative buyin~ 
association. It lmvs for and distributes to its members, and 
onlv its members, ·merchandise ,vhich is lrnncllecl hy the said 
mernbers in tl1c usua 1 course of their business as retail gro-
• cers. It does not huv for or sell or distribute to non-members 
of the Association ai1v merchandise whatsoever. The bv-laws-
of the Association provide that the rig·ht to purcluu:;e throu_g-h 
the Association shall be limited to members and is not trans~ 
ferahle, and that no member shall be allowed or permitted to 
sell anv merchandise purchased tlwomrh the Association ex-
cept in~ the regular course of his retail business, and that any 
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member found guilty of selling goods purchased through the 
Association _to non-members or otherwise disposing of such 
merchandise except in the regular course of his business shall 
be subject to a fine for each separate violation. 
8. Each member of the Association is a merchant and is 
liable for State and local retail merchant's license taxes and 
is required by law, in reporting· his sales as a basis for de-
termining his individual license taxes, to include the sales of 
all merchandise purchased through the Applicant. 
9. Immediately after its rc-org·anization in April, l.'937, 
counsel for the Applicant c.onsulted Hon. C. II. 1\forrissctt, 
State Tax Commissioner of Virginia, with reference to the 
liability of the Applicant for license taxes. Counsel for the 
Applicant contended that the Applicant was not a merchant, 
and that it was not liable for any license taxes. The Com-
missioner ruled, however, that the Applicant should be classi-
fied and taxed as a commission merchant under Section 17 4 
of the Virginia r:J~ax Code, which provides that every 
page 6 ~ person, firm or corporation buying or selling for 
another any kind of merchandise on commission, ex-
cept associations or organizations of farmers, including- prod-
uce exchanges organized and maintained by farmers in the 
marketing- of their produce and not for profit, shall be a com-
mission merchant. Counsel for the Applicant then consulted 
the taxing· authorities of the City of Richmond, who similarly 
ruled that the Applicant was taxable as a commission mer-
chant under the provisions of Section 86 of Chapter 10 of the 
Richmond City Code, which contains language practically 
identical with that of Section 174 of the Tax Code of Vir-
ginia. The Applicant was thereupon assessed with State 
and City commission merchant's license taxes for the year 
1937 and hacs subsequently been regularly assessed with State 
and Citv commission merchant's license taxes for the vears 
1!)38 and 1939, all of which taxes have been duly and ;·egu-
larly paid. There has been no change of the afore said ruling-
of the State Tax Commissioner with reference to the Appli-
_cant, but the city authorities, no!withstandii:g· the rulings in 
1987, are now attempting· to classify tl1e Applicant as a whole-
sale merchant and to a"pply such classification retroactively 
for the years 19;37, 1938 and 1939. 
10. The Applicant alleges that it is not a merchant and 
that it is not liable for the aforesaid wholesale merchant's 
license taxes assessed against it by the City of Richmond on 
April 15, 1939, mid that it has duly and regularly paid all 
taxes for which it is liable to the City of Richmond for tlw 
said vears 1937. 19:~g and 1939. 
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its business is interstate commerce, and that the taxes sought 
to be imposed thereon by the City of Richmond are taxes 
upon that commerce and constitute a burden thereon con-
trary to and in contravention of the provisions of the Con-
stitution of the United States, and that said ta'xes are, there-
fore, unconstitutional and void. 
·wHEREFORE, the Applicant prays that this Court re-
view the aforesaid assessments made bv the Commissioner 
of the Revenue for the City of Richmond on the 15th day of 
.April, 1939, declare the same erroneous, unconstitutional, null 
and void, enter an order correcting and annulling the same 
and exonerating the Applicant from the payment of the taxes 
charged thereby a~d the penalties and interest 
page 7 }- added thereto, and enter such other orders and grant 
. to the Applieant such other and further relief as 
the Court may deem proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHMOND FOOD STORES, INCORPOR1lTED, 
By J. VAUGHAN GARY, Counsel. 
page 8 } And at the same Husting·s Court, to-wit: on the 
7th day of June, 1939, the following order was en-
tered, docketing the said application and continuing the same: 
page 9} Hustings Court of City of Richmond., June 7, 1930. 
Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, 
1.,. 
City of Richmond. 
ORDER DOCKETING CAUSE. 
This day appeared Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, 
by counsel, and the City of Richmond, by Henry R. Miller, 
Jr., Assistant City Attorney, and the "said Richmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated, applied to the Court for relief from 
alleged erroneous assessments of city wholesale merchant's 
license taxes made against it for the yeal's 1937, 1938 and 
1939, filing with the Court its application in writing setting 
forth the manner in which it considered itself aggrieved by the 
said assessments. 
Upon motion of the Applicant, with the consent of the City, 
the cause was docketed and continued. 
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page 10 }- And at a like Hustings Court, held in said City 
· on the 15th day of September, 1939, the City of 
Richmond filed its answer to the said application, which said 
answer is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 11 ~ Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond .. 
Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, Applicant 
V. 
City of Richmond, Respondent 
':Pbe answer of the City of Richmond to the application of 
Richmond li.,ood Stores, Incorporated, made to the Hustings 
Court of the City of Richmond. 
This respondent for answer to said application, or as· much 
thereof as it is advised it is mate1ial it should answer, an-
swering, says : 
1. This respondent denies the allegations contained in 
P.aragTaph numbered 1 of the application in so far as said 
allegations are intended to allege that the applicant is .an 
association composed of 144 members who are not themselves 
. separate and distinct from the separate legal entity of the 
association itself, and further denies said alleg·ations in· so 
far as they are intended to alleg·e that the purpose of the 
formation of the association was to enable the retail stores 
to buy collectively, as distinguished from enabling the as-
sociation itself, as a separate legal entity, to buy in large 
quantities and sell to tbe retail st.ores at a figure below that 
which the retail stores would have to pay if they boug·ht from 
some other person, firm or corporation. 
This respondent is informed and believes and, therefore, 
a11cg·es that the applicant bought merchandise in its own 
name and right and sold such merchandise in its own name 
and rhrht and that the 144 retail stores houg·ht me1~chandisc 
from the applicant and did not buy merchandise from per-
sons. firms or corporations other than the appli-
page 12 ~ cant; that tlle purchases so made by the applicant 
were the purchases which were the bases for the 
license taxes complained of by the a.nplicant. 
2. This respondent is advised that tl1e allegations contained 
in paragrapl1 numbered 2 of the application nre immaterial 
to the issues herein, and this respondent neither admits nor 
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denies the same and moves that said allegations be stricken 
from the application. 
3. This respondent admits as true the alleg·ations of fact 
contained in paragraph numbered 3 of said application, but 
this respondent is advised that the alleged reasons for the 
action of the State Corporation Commission are matters of 
arg·ument and matters of law and that this respondent is not 
reQuired to answer the same. ' 
4. This respondent knows nothing of the truth or falsity 
of the allegations of fact contained in paragraph numbered 
4 of said application, except that this respondent admits the 
correctness of the allegation of the provisions of the charter, 
or certificate of incorporation of the applicant, as contained · 
in the last sentence of said paragTaph numbered 4 near the 
top of pag·e 3 of the application. · 
5. This respondent admits the allegations of fact contained · 
in paragraph numbered 5 of said application with respect 
to the provisions of the charter, or certificate of incorpora-
tion of the applicant, but this respondent is informed and 
believes and, therefore, alleges that the allegations as to the 
attempts and intentions of the applicant in the. event of a 
surplus or deficit are not matters of evidence, .but are purely 
conjectural and are allegations as to hypothetical and pos-
sible conditions, as to wl1ich this respondent is not required to 
answer. 
6. 'rbis respondent admits as true the allegation contained 
in the first sentence of paragraph numbered 6 of said appli-
cation relating· to the provisions of the charter, or certifi-
cate of incorporation of the applicant. 
This respondent knows nothing of the truth or 
page 13 ~ falsity of the other allegations of fact contained 
in said paragraph numbered 6 and, therefore, 
neither affirms nor denies the same, but calls for strict proof 
thereof. This respondent, however, is advised and, there-
fore, alleges tlmt the allegation with respect to the mark-
up on vegetables in the future is not an allegation of fact 
but is an expression of ol)inion, which this respondent is not 
required to a.nswer, and this respondent moves that the same 
be stricken from the application. 
7. This respondent denies the aHcgation contained in para-
g-ranh numbered 7 of said application to the effect that th() 
application is a '' purely non-profit'' association and calls for 
strict proof thereof; this respondent further denies the al-
leg;ation in said paragTnph to the effect tlrnt said applicant 
bnys for and distributes to its members, in so far as said 
alleg-ation is intended to mean that the applicant is not en-
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gaged in the business of a merchant and does. not buy. for 
itself, as distinguished from its stockholders or members 
and this respondent calls for strict proof as to ,both of said 
allegations. 
This respondent knows nothing of the truth or falsity of 
the allegation contained in said paragraph to the effect that 
the applicant does not buy for or sell or distribute to non-
members of the Association, and, therefore, this respondent 
neither afJirms n01,· denies the same and calls for strict proof 
thereof. 
This respondent admits the allegations contained in· said 
paragraph ·as to the provisions of the by-laws of said Asso-
ciation. 
8. This respondent admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph numbered 8 of said application, except that this 
respondent denies that any of the merch~ndise sold by any 
member was purchased through the applicant in the sense 
that said merchandise is not purchased by the applicant in 
its own right and sold by the applicant in its own right to 
the members, and this respondent calls for strict proof that 
said merchandise is not purchased by the applicant 
page 14 r in its own righf and sold by it in its own right to 
its members. 
9. This respondent is advised and, therefore, alleges that 
nll of the alleg·ations contained in paragraph numbered 9 of 
said application relating to the action of the State Tax Com-
missioner. to contentions of the applicant before said Com-
missioner and the consultation of counsel for the applicant 
with the taxing· autho_rities of the City of Richmond are not 
relevant to the issues of fact and are allegations which pre-
sent arguments of questions of law, which this respondent is 
not. required to answer; said paragraph does not allege that 
tl1e action of the State Tax Commissioner and the taxing au-
thorities of the City of R.iclnnond was taken after a full and 
eomplete disclosure of all of the facts which this respondent 
believes and alleges herein to have existed· and the said ap-
plication herein does not allege in any manner what the facts 
were npon which said authorities acted, and this respondent. 
therefore, moves that all of tbe allegations contained in para-
irraph numbered 9 with respect to the action of said authori-
tiPR he stricken from the application. 
This respondent admits as true the allegation in sai.d para-
gTauh numbered 9 that tlie applicant was assessed with 1937, 
19:l8 and 19R9 ci(v license taxes as a commission merchant 
and that said fayes have~ heen paid, but this respondent is ad-
vised and, therefore, alleges that proper credit has been al-
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lowed by this respondent upon the entire taxes as a whole-
sale merchant by reason of the payment of the license taxes 
as a commission merchant. 
10. This respondent is advised that the allegation contained 
· in paragraph numbered 10 of the application that the appli-
cant is not a merchant is a matter of law, which this respond-
ent is not required to answer, but this respondent is informed 
and, therefore, alleges that the applicant is now and has been 
since its creation in April, 1937, engaged in the business of 
buying and selling· goods, wares and merchandise .. 
11. This respondent knows nothing of the truth 
page 15 } or falsity of the allegations contained in para-
graph numbered 11 of said application, and· in so 
far as said allegation~ are intended to ,be allegations of fact 
and not matters or conclusions of law, this respondent calls 
for strict proof thereof. 
12. This respondent further answering says that it is in· 
formed and believes and, therefore, alleges that the applicant 
is a corporation, org·anized and existing under the laws of 
the State of Virginia, with its principal office or place of busi-
ness in the City of R.ichmond, and is a body, ·politic and cor-
porate, separate and distinct from its stockholders or mem-
bers; that since its creation in April, 1937, it has been en-
gaged in the City of Rfohmond in the business of buying 
goods, wares and merchandise in its own name and right 
and for its own account, and selling said goods, wares and 
merchandise to said retail merchants for the purpose of en-
abling said retail merchants to resell said goods, wares and 
merchandise to others; that the amounts of purchases upon 
which the licenses of said applicant as a wholesale merchant 
for the years involved are based under the statutes of Virginia 
and the ordinances of the City of R.ichmond were in the 
amounts shown in the notice o:f the assessment lawfully given 
to the applicant and said assessment. now remains unpaid. 
And this respondent having fully answered prays to be 
lienee dismissed with its own proper costs in its behalf ex-
pended. 
H0RACE H. ED"\VARDS. 
City Attorney, · 
CITY OF RICHMOND, · 
By Counsel. 
HENRY R. MILLER, JR., 
Assistant City A_ttorney, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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page 16 ~ And at another day, at a like Hustings Court, 
. held for said City on the 9th day of May, 1940, the 
following order was entered, to-wit; 
page 17 ~ Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
May 9, 1940. 
Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, Applicant 
v. 
City of Richmond, Respondent 
This matter came on to be heard on the application of the 
Richmond Food .Stores, Incorporated, the answer of the City 
of Richmond, and tho testimony of witnesses in open court 
and was argued by counsel.. 
This matter was defended by the City Attorney and the 
Commissioner of the Revenue who made the assessmentt; 
complained of was examined as a witness touching the ap-
plication-
Uµon consideration whereof, the conrt is of opinion and 
doth so adjudge, order and decree tl1at the application of 
Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, for relief from the 
assessments of taxes complained of should be denied, and 
it is, therefore, further ordered tlmt said applicant be re-
quired to pay the costs of this proceeding, to which action 
of the eourt the Richmond Food 1Stores, Incorporated, by 
counscIJ excepted and prayed that its exception be noted of 
record. which is accordingly done. 
The Court cloth further certify that the facts proven are 
thoRe embodied in the transcript of the testimony and the 
exhibits referred to therein, which transcript and exhibits 
Imve been :filed herein and are hereby made a part of the 
record. 
pagP- 18 ~ Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
Ricl1mond Food Stores, Incorporated, 
v. 
City of Richmond. 
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CERTIFI·CATE OF EXCEPTION. 
I, John L. Ingram, ,Judge of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, who presided over the trial of the 
above-entitled cause in said Court at Richmond, Virg'inia, 
September 15 and 16, 1939, do certify that the attached ex-
hibits, marked '' Exhibits Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 12 R, rejected", 
and initialed ",J. L. I.", were offered as evidence on behalf 
of Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated; that counsel for the 
City of Richmond admitted the authenticity of the exhibits, 
but objected to their introduction on the ground that they 
were not material to the issues in the case; and that the ob--
jection was sustained and the exhibits rejected by the Court, 
to which action of the Court counsel for Richmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated, duly excepted. 
Teste: This 27th day of June, 1940, after notice to counsel 
for the City of Ricl1mond, as required by law . 
page 19 ~ 
State Tax Commissioner, 
Hon. C. H. l\f orrissett, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Dear l\fr. l\forrissett : 
.TOHN L. INGRAM, Judge. 
COPY 
June 22, 1937. 
In re : Ricl1mond Food Stores, Inc. 
On Aug·ust 29, 1935, a number of retail merchants eng·aged 
in the grocery business in the City of Richmond organized 
thP. R.icl1mond Food Stores, Inc., a non-stock corporation, 
for tJie purpose of cooperative purchasing-. Each of tl1e mer-
chants put un $300.00, which entitled them to membership in 
tl1e corporation. 
On November 21, 1935, Richmond Food Btores, Inc., took 
011t H State whol(l~R fo mm·chant 's license hased upon esti-
materl mwcliases of $4.fiOO.OO. The purchases of the cor-
poration clnrirnr 1935 flm01mted to $25,463.25~ 11pon which an 
ricl.iustmcnt of liccnsr tax w·as made on .Tulv 31. 1936. The 
JiP-ensP for 1936 ,1las issued on a basis of nrohable purchase.~ 
ctf $50,000.00. Tl1e actual purchases during the year 1936 
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amounted to $211,379.21 and Mr. Leake has assessed the cor-
poration with an additional tax for 1936 of $209.79 based upon 
excess purchases of $161,379.21. 
On April 28, 1937, the non-stock corp0ration was dissolved 
and a new corporation with the same name was organized 
under Section 3855 of the Code of Virginia, known as the 
'' Cooperative Association Act" . 
.As Counsel for the corporation, I desire to .submit that 
Richmond Food Stores, Inc., is not and has not been since its 
original incorporation in Aug11st, 1935, engaged in the busi-
ness of a wholesale merchant as defined by Section 188 of the 
Tax Code of Virginia. When the original charter was ob-
tained each mercl1ant participating· in its organization put 
up $300.00 as bis portion of the investment necessary to 
carry on the activities of the corporation. The corporation 
being a non-stock corporation, no stock was issued to the 
members, but each merchant. who invested the $300.00 be-
came a niem.ber of the corporation. The purpose of the cor-
poration was solely to buy merchandise for its members. Un-
der the original plan the merchandise was bought and billed 
to the members at cost price and each member was called 
upon periodically to pay his portion of the expense of op-
era ting the corporation. Tl1is plan, however, proved a little 
. difficult of administration, so tliat a change was made where=-
by the corporation boug·ht merchandise for its members and 
added to the cost price a small percentage of the cost price 
which it was estimated would defray the expenses of operat-
ing· the corporation. 
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Section 385a of the Code of Virginia requires a cooperative 
association to issue stock. The. new corporation is~ therefore, 
capitalized with a maximum capital stock of $50~000.00, di-
vided into 500 shares, the par value of which is $100.00 each. 
The charter provides, however, that the voting power is 
limited to members, each of whom s11all be entitled to one 
and only one vote, regardless of the number of shares of 
stock he may own. The dividends,, if any, are distributed 
and•prorated among· the members in accordance with the pur-
chases and' not in accordance with stock ownership and, upon _. 
dhisolution. after payimr off t11e par value of the stock~ th~ 
remaining· assets are to he divided between the members of 
th<-! Association in nroportion to the amount of .business done 
hy earh mPmher "-ri.th or through the Association. The stock, 
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the ref ore, has practically no value. Each member is required 
to own three shares of stock and three shares of stock of the 
new corporation were issued to each member in exchange for 
his memberspip certificate in the old corporation. The busi-
ness of the old corporation was and the business of the new 
corporation is limited entirely to members. No sales of mer-
cliandise whatever were or are made to other than members. 
The old corporation was and the new corporation is operated 
strictly on a non-profit basis, the purpose of the pe'rcentage 
increase which is added to the cost price of the goods being 
intended solely to defray the expenses of operation of the 
corporation. 
It is submitted that under this statement of facts neither 
corporation should be classified as a wholesale merchant. It 
is admitted that the corporation is not exempt fr~m taxation, 
-but it appears very doubtful as to whether it is liable for a 
license tax. The only license which could possibly be con-
strued to cover its activities is that of a commission mer-
chant. Section 17 4 of the Tax Code provides as follows : 
"Every person, firm or corporation, buying or selling for 
another, any kind of merchandise on commission, except as-
socia.tiom; or organizations of farmers, including produce ex-
changes organized and maintained for farmers by mutual help 
in the marketing of their produce and not for profit, shall be 
a commission merchant.'' 
The Richmond Food Stores, Inc., does buy merchandise for 
iti::1 members and distributes the same to its members, adding 
thP.reto a small percentage to cover the cost of its operatton. 
This may bring the corporation within the language of Sec-
tion 17 4 of the Tax Code quoted a.hove. · 
WP. shall appreciate it if you will g·ive this matter your 
comddcration and favor the corporation with an adjustment_ 
of its taxes for the yea.rs 1936 a.nd 1937. If there is any ad-
ditional information which yon may desire with reference 
to the matter, I shall be very glad to furnish the same upon 
.request. 
Respectfully yours, 
.TVG:S (Signed) .T. VAUGHAN GARY 
3S Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
page 21 ~ COPY 
COMMON"WEALTH 0~, VIRGINIA 
·DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 
· RICHlVIOND 
Hon. J. Vauglian Gary, 
Attorney at Law, 
State Planters Bank Building, 
Richmond, Vfrg-inia. 
June 25, 1937. 
My clea.r l\fr. Gary : . 
Your letter of the 22nd instant, in relation to the Richmond 
1]1ood Stores, Incorporated, has been received and sym-
pathetically read .. 
A.s you know, the corporation is a separate and distinct legal 
entity from its members or stockl10Iders. This is true whether 
the corporation be stock or non-stock. The purpose of creat-
ing· a corporation is to create an artificial person separate and 
distinct from the individuals who may be interested. 
rrhis corporation up until April 28, 1937, was engag·ed in 
buying· and selling merchandise straightout, and I am unable 
to :find any ground on which to hold that the corporation was 
not a merchant and subject to the regular license taxes im-
posed on merchants. This holding does not result in any 
injust.ice, because the corporation has been taking· the place 
of an independent wholesaler and has been in competition 
with other wholesalers. All business and quasi-business cor-
l)orations are operated for the benefit of their stockholders 
or members. The value of a corporation is not always meas-
ured by dividends paid in money. Even a charitable cor-
poration if it engages in the business of buying and selling 
merchandise is subject to merchants' license taxation. 
Beginning· Anril 28, 1937, when. a new corporation was or-
g·anized under Section 3855 of tl1e Code of Virginia, the cor-
portion may he classified as a commission merchant under 
Section 17 4 of the Tax Code., but as it a.lreadv has a whole-
~ale mel'cbant 's license for 1937, no advantage would result 
from taking• out a commission merchant's license now for the 
residue o(this year. .A commission merchant's license may 
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be taken out in January, 1938, for 1938, and the tax will be 
measured by the gross commissions. 
With best wishes, I am 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) C. H. :MORRISSETT 
State Tax Commissioner. 
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COMMONvVEALTH OF VIR,GINIA 
DEP AR.TMENT OJ, TAXATION 
RICHMOND 
Hon. J. Vaughan Gary, 
Attorney at Law, 
State-Planters Bank Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
My dear Mr. Gary: 
July 3, 1937. I 
R.eference is made to our telephone conversation concern-
ing the Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated. 
I find that the Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, took 
out a State merchant's license on January 30, 1937, on a 
quarterly basis, measured by purchases throughout 1936, of: 
$211.379.21. The tax for the first quarter was $77 .95, plus 
the regular issuance fee of 50c, making a total of $78.45. 
The records indicate that a similar license for the second 
quarter has not been taken out. The chang·e in the manner 
~f doing the business did not come about until April 28, 1937, 
and the corporation should have taken out a wholesale mer-
. chant's license for the second quarter at the same price which 
the first quarter cost. I do not tl1ink I can l1old that this cor-
poration can be given a clean bill of health for the second 
quarter of 1937 on the taking out of a commission merchant's 
license dating· from about April 28, 1937. Accordingly, I am 
constrnincd to suggest that a license for the second quarter 
of J 937 be taken out now and that a commission merchant's 
license he taken out covering the last six months of 1937. 
In order to expedite this matter, the Department of Taxa-
tion will itself assess the license for the second quarter of 
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19:17, and will advise the commissioner of the revenue of the 
city of Richmond to issue on application a commission mer-
c.hant's license for the last six months of 1937. 
Apparently, the additional assessment made by the De-
partment of Taxation for 1936, amounting to $209.79· has not 
been paid. This assessment was billed on 1\fay 20, 1937. It 
should be paid without further delay. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to J\:fr. Goode. 
With best wishes, .I am 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) C. H. MORRISSETT 
State Tax Commissioner. 
cc-Mr. Jno C. Goode, 
Commissioner of the Revenue, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
page 23 ~ COPY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION 
RICHMOND 
Hon. J. Yaughan Gary, 
Attorney at Law, 
.State-Planters Bank Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. · 
Dear Sir: 
May 31, 1939 
The records of this office show that charter was issued 
on April 28, 1937, for a cooperative association under the 
provision of Section 3855 of the Gode by the name of Rich-
mond Food Stores, Incorporated. 
Although the first paragraph of Section 3855 requires· the 
use of the worcl "co-operative" as a pa.rt of the name of 
associations organized thereunder, Section 21 of the Coopera-
tive Marketing Act. enacted subsequent to Section 3855 of 
the Code. prohibits ·tl1e use of the word "cooperative" as a 
part of the name -of any corporation other t.han a cooperative 
ma.rketim~: assoriation org:anized under the provisions of said 
Cooperative 1\farketing Act. 
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Therefore, the Commission has ruled that cooperative as-
sociations under Section 3855 of the Code may not use the 
word "coopera.tive" as a part of the corporate name. 
Very truly yours, 
NWA.jB 
(Signed) N. W. ATKINSON 
Clerk of the Commission. 
page 24} .And now, at this day, to-wit, At a like Hustings 
Court, held in said City of Richmond, at the Court-
house, on the 27th day of June, 1940, (being the same day 
and year first hereinbefore written), the said Petitioner, with 
the leave of the Court tendered his Certificate of Exceptions, 
which is received, signed and sealed by the Court and made a 
part of the record in this case, and the Court delivered to 
the Clerk of this Court a transcript of the testimony and 
other incidents of the trial of this case, all duly authenticated, 
which Certificate of Exceptions, transcript of the testimony 
and incidents of trial are in the·words and figures following; 
to-wit; 
page 25 } Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
Richmond Food Stores, Inc. 
'I). 
City of Richmond 
Stenographic report of testimony and other incidents of 
the trial of the case of Richmond Food Stores, Inc., v. City 
of Richmond, in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, 
Richmond, Virginia, before Honorable John L. Ing-ram, Judge 
of saitl court, which trial began on the 15th day of Septem-
ber. 1939, and ended on the 16th day of September, 1939. 
Appearances: ,J. Vaughan Gary, Esq., counsel for peti-
tioner. 
Henry R. Miller, Jr., Esq., Assistant City Attorney, coun-
"8el :for defendant. 
page 26 ~ Index to Witnesses 
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page 27 .~ JOHN C. GOODE, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly swom, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. State your name and occupation. 
A. John 0. Goode; commissioner of Revenue, City of Rich-
mond, Virginia. 
Q. Mr. Goode, were the assessments of wholesale mer-
chant's license taxes for the years 1937, 1938 and 1939· against 
the Richmond ] 1ood Stores, Incorporated, made in your of-
fice? 
A. The commission merchant's license was. 
Q. I said the wholesale? 
A. No. The commission merchant's is my recolledion. 
1.937 assessment is retail merchant on part of the business 
and assessed as commission merchant on the rest, 1938 as-
sessed as commission merchant and 1939· they were assessed 
as commission merchants. 
Q. For both state and city purposes¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now who made the assessment of wholesale merchant's 
license taxes which are complained of in this application? 
A. 1\fade by our license deputy. 
page 28 ~ Q. It was made in your office Y 
A. No, we don't issue any such license as that. 
Mr. Trcsnon can tell you that. 
Q. Mr. Tresnon is the deputy? 
A. Handling licenses. 
Q. And if there were assessments of that kind made, they 
were made by him? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Then you don't know anything about the wholesale 
merchant's license at all f 
A. No. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\f.1'. Miller: 
Q. The property taxes that were assessed against this cor-
poration are committed to you? .... 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·wm you tell what a&sessments were made against the 
corporation on the p1;operty? 
Richmond Food Stores, Inc., v. City of Richmond. 43 
John C. Goode. 
A. Personal property f 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. In 1937 they were assessed on a valuation of $325.00; 
in 1938, $1,000.00; 1939, assessed on $1,350.00. 
Q. There were not any other taxes on property assessed 
against the corporation for any one of those three 
page 29 t years, where they? 
A. No, other than those mentioned. 
Q. ·what was the rate on that tax? 
A. $2.20. 
Q. $2.20 per hundred dollars of value Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have given the values t 
A. That is right. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Mr. Goode, do you know what items made up that prop-
ertv? 
.A. I presume office furniture and tables. 
Q. How is the property of a commission merchant as-
sessed 7 
A. At that time assess·ed at fair market value. 
Q. How is the property of a commission merchant as-
sessed 7 
A. Physical personal property assessed at $2.20. 
Q. It is assessed as tangible personal property? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Commission merchants 7 
A. That is right. 
Q. How is it assessed for state purposes 7 
A. For commission merchant the state does not have any 
personal property tax. The office furniture and such trucks 
as are used in business a re personal property for local reve-
nue. 
pag·e 30 ~ Q. Doesn't the sta tc claim tl1e right to assess 
commission merchants on their intangibles as 
capital? 
A. That is right, but that isn't used as the capital. It goes 
directly to tlrn personal property. If it is the capital; goes 
direct as personal property assessed for local revenue. 
Q. Has your office ca11ed upon the Richmond Food Stores, 
Incorporated, for any additional assessment of property? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
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II. E. Tresnon. 
Q. So far as you know, they have paid all the taxes that 
were properly charged them t 
A. I don't know whether they paid it or not; we don't col-
lect. I couldn't say whether they were paid or not. 
Q. So far as you know, they have been assessed with all 
taxes with which they are properly ~hargeable. 
A. That is right. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 81 ~ H. C. TRESNON, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Please state your name and occupation. 
A. Henry E. Tresnon; Deputy Commissioner of Revenue. 
Q. Did you as Deputy Commissioner of the :i,:tevenue of the 
City of Richmond asse·ss the Richmond Food Stores with 
city ·commission merchant's license for the years 1937, 1938 
and 1929? 
A. I did. 
Q. Have you copies of those assessments? 
A. I haven't the amount of them, but I know the basis on 
which they were paid. 
Mr. Gary: ]Hr. Miller told me that he would have copies 
made and I was just goinp: to pave the way for the introduc-
tion of those copies as exhibits. 
:Mr. Miller·: I understood they were to be here. The li-
cenRe inspector said they are prepared in his office. We will 
Jiave them here in a moment. 
1\fr. Gary: Now may it please the Court, can 
page 32 ~ we have it understood those copies are filed here 
as exhibits so. I can go on with the examination f 
The Court: All rig·ht, sir .. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Have von the nmounts of those taxes for each of the 
vears. Mr. Tresnon? 
· A. Tlie amount of each classification for each year is--
I don't know the exact amount, but they were paid as a mer-
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chant. In February, 1937, the Richmond Food Stores paid 
a merchant's license in February and in July of 1937 they 
paid a. commission merchant's license, but they paid the com-
mission merchant's license in 1937 as Richmond Food Stores 
Cooperative and in February, 1937, they paid as Richmond 
~,ood Stores, Incorporated, as a merchant. 
Q. As a matter of fact, when the tax was paid as a mer-
chant hr 1937 it was paid only for the first half of the year; 
is that true? 
A. It was paid-I think if I remember rig·htly, the state 
tax on that was $119.00. Now whether it was a quarter pay-
ment or half payment, I don't remember. 
Q. The state license was paid quarterly and the city li-
cense was paid semi-annually. 
A. That may be true, but I know the payment 
page 33} was made in February as Richmond Food ,Stores, 
Incorporated. 
Q. Then at the end of that half year on July 1st, it was 
then assessed with the commission merchant's license? 
A. Not the Richmond ,Food Stores; it wasn't assessed as 
a commission merchant, but the Richmond Food Stores Co-
operative. That word ''Cooperative'' was in the application 
when the application was made for the commission merchant's 
license. 
Q. Now do you recall wl1at took place at the time that 
change was macle? 
A. That was on the aut110rity of the State Tax Commis-
Rioner from a letter from him presented to me by counsel for 
the company. 
1\fr. Gary: l\[ay it please the Court, at the present time 
I desire to offer in evidence copv of a letter addressed to 
Honorable a. H. Morrissette; if is an original carbon copy 
of a letter which I personally wrote to Mr. Morrissette under 
<l;:i.te of June 22, 1937. The carbon copy is not signed, but 
it was written by me as counsel for Richmond Food Stores, 
Incorporated. 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, I object to the intro-
duction of this carbon copy for the reason that it relates to 
matters that are not material to the issue in this 
pa~re 34 ~ case and that its purpose. I 1Jelieve, is for use in 
arg-nment to show the· ruling made by the State 
Tax Commissioner with respect to a state license and I think 
whatever value it has relates to the va.lue as a matter of 
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H. E. Tresnon. 
argument and not a matter of evidence, and I therefore move 
to reject the introduction of the paper in evidence. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Gary: May it please the Court, we except to that rul-
ing. May I get this straight f Mr. :Miller is not objecting 
to this on the gTound that is it a carbon copy, but because it 
is immaterial to the issue 1 
'l1he Court': That is right. 
Mr. Gary: Now may it please the Court, I desire to offer 
in evidence a letter dated June 25tli, addressed to me as 
counsel for the Richmond Food Stores, signed by Mr. C. H. 
Morrissette, State Tax Commissioner, showing his ruling with 
reference to this classification of this corporation for the pur-
pose of taxation. 
Mr. Miller: Objection by the city for the same 
pag·e 35 ~ reasons. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
l\fr. Gary: Exception. I would also like to offer in evi-
dence a letter dated July 3, 1937, addressed to me as· counsel 
for the Richmond Ji,ood Stores, Incorporated, signed by l\fr. 
C. H. Morrissette, State Tax Commissioner, with reference 
to a further ruling in connection with the matter. 
Mr. Miller: Same objection. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Gary: ·Exception. I would like to have the oppor-
tunity of arguing my position. 
The Court: I don't object to the administrative acts, but 
I don't want the opinion of the Commissioner in the case of 
the Tax Commission, either. 
Mr. Gary: May it please tl1e Court, these letters show that 
the State Tax Commissioner instructed the Commissioner of 
ReYenue to assess the corporation as a. commission merchant. 
The Court: You l1ave already got Mr. Tresnon's state-
ment to that effect in the record and he carried it out. That 
is all you are entitled to; the }Jractice, not why. 
page 36} !fr. Gary: Now may it please the Court, may 
the record show the contents of these letters so 
that in the event tliat the matter goes to a big-her court the 
court may know what the ~.ontents of the letters were\ 
The Court: Yes, you can put them in. They should be put 
in as cut out of the record. 
Note: The three letters were filed and marked Exhibits 4 
5~ 6, Rejected, respectively. ' 
' 
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Mr. Gary: That is just to show what we were offering to 
introduce. 
The Court: That is all right. 
Mr. Gary: I have here the exhibits that were previously 
filed. the commission merchant's license for 1937 and 1938 
and ·1939. · · 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. I hand you what reports to be copies of the wholesale 
merehant 's license tax assessed against R.ichmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated, for the years 1937 and 1938 and 1939. 
·wm you examine those and see if they are true copies of the 
assessments made? 
A. These eopies are from a special audit made 
page 37 ~ by the Comptroller's office in which were made the 
assessments, yes. 
Q. As of what date? 
A. As of 1938, 1937-
Q. I mean on ,vbat' date were they made 1 
A. On the .15th day of April, 1939. 
Q. You stated that the company had been previously as-
sessed with commission merchant's license taxPs for 1937, 
1938 and 1939. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Unon instructions of Mr. C. H. Morrissette, the Tax 
Commissioner of Virginia? 
A. They were assessed-I am speaking of the commission 
merchant. 
Q. That is right 1 
A. vVe will have to go back to 1937. They made a report 
out as a merchant, as previo~sly stated, as Richmond Food 
Stores, and paid the license. Then later they came in under 
instructions from l\fr. l\fonissette aJ1d they made applica-
tion for and naid a commission merchant's license as Rich-
mond Food Stores Corporative and subsequent to those 
years-
1\f r. Miller: If Your Honor please, I object to the witness 
testifying to tl1e assessmeut made uuder instruc .. 
pag·c 38 ~ Hom; from the State tax Commissioner on account 
of state taxes as being immaterial to the issue in-
volved here. This is a case involving the city taxes only. 
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The Court: Is there anv difference between the state and 
citv license laws T ., 
J\fr. Miller: There is no material difference between the 
state and city laws, but I don't know for what purpose the 
evidence as to the assessment of the state taxes may be in-
troduced and until it is shown that it is ~aterial to the is~ 
sues here I think it is to be properly excluded. 
The Court : "\Vha t is the reason T 
Mr. Gary·: May it please the Court, to show why the 
change in classification was made, upon whose order it was 
made. They had been previously classified as a merchant. 
The classification was changed in the middle of the year from 
a merchant to a commission merchant. I just wanted to show 
by the Commissioner why the change was made in the middle 
of the year, why it was made at that time. 
The Court : All right, go ahead. 
page 39 ~ Mr. Miller: Exception. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. All right, Mr. Tresnon; answer. 
_A. We speak of the state license. Of course, when a com-
mission merchant makes a report for state purposes, the 
City of Richmond having the same classificatio~=-
Thc Court: There is no use going into that. Just say on 
authority of the Tax Commissioner. Wouldn't that be suf-
ficient? 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. The change was made on instructions from the State 
Tax Commissioner. 
A. Right. 
Q. Now tbe city and state license laws dealing with classi-
fications are almost identical, ai'e they n:~6) 
A. They are similar, yes. 
Q. Is it the practice of the Commissioner's office in mak-
in~: city assessments1 to follow the elassification made for the 
state Assessments? ' 
A. To use the state classification for city classification on 
the citv basis. 
Q. So when the instructions came to change for the state 
faxes a similar c1mnge was made in the city taxes t 
A. That is right. 
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Mr. Gary: May it please the Court, can we 
page 40 ~ stipulate by agreement · all of these assessments 
have been paid? Mr. Tresnon cannot testify to 
that-I mean the commission merchant's taxes have been 
paid. 
Mr. Miller: Yes. 
Mr. Gary: Then it is stipulated between counsel that the 
assessments as made against the association for the commis-
sion merchant's license taxes for the years 1937, 1938, and 
1939 were regularly paid. 
Q. Now, J\fr. Tresnon, upon whose instructions were assess-
ments of wholesale merchant's taxes made? 
A. That certification was made from a special audit under 
th~ City Auditor. They have a special auditor, a gentleman 
who g·oes around and makes special audits of all different 
classifications of h1;1siness in Richmond. 'rhey are certified to 
this office-to the Commissioner of Revenue, that these peo-
ple were liable for merchant's license taxes on a certain 
amount for the yea.rs 1937, 1938 and 1939 and on that au-
.thority we certified the license. 
Q. Certified to by the Comptroller's office! 
A. Yes, sir, from the Comptroller's office. In fact, we 
got it from the license inspector, but it is certified from 
the Comptroller's office by a special audit which has been 
made and the party's name that made the audit 
page 41 } is on the certification. 
Q. That is, the city Comptroller's office! 
A. Yes, the city. 
Q. Have you been instructed by the state to assess state 
wholesale merchant's license taxes a~:ainst the association 
for 1937, 1938 and 1939? · 
A. I have seen no instructions of tlmt kind. 
Q. Have state wholesale merchant's license taxes been as-
sei:ised against the company for 1937, 1938 and 19391 
A. Not according to our records, no, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Miller: 
·Q. Had you received any such instructions from the state, 
you would certainly assess the wholesale merchant's license 
btx, would you noU 
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A. Mr. Miller, + couldn't assess for back years; I could only 
assess the current year. · 
Q. 1939! 
A. Yes. 
Q. :\Ir. Tresnon, when you said it was the practice to fol-
low the city assessment along with the state assessment you 
meant where one was a commission merchant and made an 
application for a license tax as a commission merchant for 
state purposes and reported the information for state pur-
poses, then you simply used that same informa-
page 42 ~ tion for assessing the city tax. 
A. Yes, sir, that is it. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. And the same is true with reference to a wholesale mer-
chant's license tax? 
A.. Yes, sir. The city license code provides for that. 
Note : The copies of the wholesale merchant "s license taxes 
were filed and marked as Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 43 ~ J. C. POWERS, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Mr. Powers, state your name and occupation? 
A . .T. C. Powers, license inspector. 
Q. How long have you been license inspector in the City 
of Ricl1mond 1 
A. I have been with tl1e city since 1921.; license inspector 
al1out twelve years. 
Q. "\Yill you state to the Court.your recollection as to what 
took p13=ce with reference to the chang·e of the classification 
0£ H.ichmond Food Stores, Incorporated, from a merchant to 
a commission merclumt in 1937? 
1\f r. Miller : I object, if Your Honor please, for the same 
reasons given with respect to the introduction of t.he letters. 
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.1. C. Powers. 
I have no ·objection to Mr. Powers saying, as :Mr. Tresnon 
did, that be acted on instructions o!: the State Tax Commis-
sioner, but I object to the introduction of his tes-
page 44 l timony as to what took place at that time. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Gary : Exception. · 
Q. J\fr. Powers, how was Richmond F:ood Stores, Incorpo-
rated assessed by the city prior to 193H 
A. It was assessed by the Commissioner of Revenue. The 
city doesn't assess; the Commissioner of Revenue does all 
the assessing. 
Q. How were they assessed with city taxes f 
A. Throu.g·h the Commissioner of Revenue. 
Q. And with what city license tax were they assessed 1 
A. ·wholesale merchant's. 
Q. vVas a change of their tax classification made in 19371 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you state why that change was made? 
A. That is the same question that you put to me a while 
ago in a different form. 
Q. I asked the question-
The Court: Go ahead and answer. The only answer you 
will be permitted to give will be on the authority of the Tax 
Commissioner. 
A. vVell, all changes are made for the city by the Com-
missioner of Revenue and I understand from the authority 
of the Tax Commissioner. 
Q. It is the custom of the city to follow the classi-
page 45 ~ fication established by the state in such matters, 
is it not? 
A. Yes. For the same classification tJJe same assessment 
follows. 
Q. Consequently, when the state classification chang·es the 
city classification is changed with it. 
A. You get a bill the same time. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By l\f r. Miller : 
· Q. The converse is equally true, is it not'? vVl1en the city 
changes its classification and that is reported to the state, 
the state may also change its classification? 
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A. The state 0? 
.A. Yes .. 
A. For the same classimcation automatically both of them 
work on the same basis. I mean by that mer~hant or whole-
sale merchant or commission merchant, or whichever it may 
be. 
Q. I mean if the city found out one should be classified as 
a wholesale merchant and reported that fact to the state, it 
would be the practice of the state officers to make the same 
change as made when the situation is just reversed. 
A. Yes, when they find that out. 
Q. ·when you made your change as to the city 
page 46 r assessment I understood you to say you acted on 
instructions from the State Tax Commissioner, did 
I understand you correctly? Is that what you said, and, if 
so, did you really mean that 1 , 
A. Here is what I meant, Mr. Miller, to get down to it. In 
1937 this change was made through conversation-
Q. Don't tell the conversation; I didn't ask you that. I 
asked if I understood you corrcc.tly in saying that you changed 
the city tax because the State Tax Commissioner instructed 
you to do so; is that righU 
A. Instructed the Commissioner of Revenue and our bill 
came_ through from the Commissioner of Revenue's office. 
Q. You are under the Comptroller of the city, are you not 0l 
· A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And when Mr. Tresnon said the assessment in his office 
was made upon instructions of the Comptroller, you know 
as a matter of fact that your of.flee as a part of the Comp-
troller's office made the recommendation or the assessment 
of the city taxes, do you know¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT E,XAMINATION. 
Bv :M:r. Gary: · 
··Q. Did you make the recommendation to the Commissioner 
of the Revenue upon which the wholesale merchant's license 
taxes for 1937, 1938 and 1939 were as~essed against 
page 47 ~ the Richm011cl Food Stores on April 15, 19:391 
A. Yes, sir. We submitted the whole recommen-
dation to the Commissioner's office as submitted to the de-
partment by the field auditor. 
Q. And it was on your instructions tl1at he changed the 
assessments or made this true assessment? 
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A. Yes; the field auditor ·of the department. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. I hand you a carbon copy of two sheets entitled: ''Basis 
for assessment of omitted license taxes'' and ask you if this 
represents the statement showing the computation of the· 
amounts now claimed by the city to be due from the Rich-
mond Food Stores, Incorporated f 
A.. Yes, sir, this is one of the copies we submitted to the 
Commissioner of Reyenue along with the letter. 
Q. "\Vas that prepared in your office! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I ask you to file that as 'E•xhibit J. C. P. #L 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit J. C. P. #1. 
Q. That statement shows there that full credits were al-
lowed on the taxes now claimed by licenses or taxes already 
paid, does it not 1 
A.· Yes, sir. 
Q. And the amounts shown there are now claimed 
page 48 ~ by the city on account of wholesale commission 
merchant's license taxes ag-ainst this corporation;' 
that is true, isn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 49 } J. W. YOUNG, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being ,first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. l\fr. Young·, please state your name and occupation? 
A. J. W. Young; executive secretary, Richmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated. . 
Q. How long have you been employed as executive secre-
tary of the association? 
A. Three and a half years. . 
Q. Were you connected with the organization prior to that 
. time? 
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A. No, sir, I came with them three months after they started 
or four months after they started. 
Q. When was the Richmond Food Stores :first organized! 
A. I think it was in .September, 1H35. 
Q. What kind of organization was it at that time from a 
corporate standpoint 1 
A. "\Vell, I am not familiar with the corporate set-up, Mr. 
Gary, in the early stages of this organization. Mr. Whitlock 
is more familiar with that than I am because when I came 
to them in 193G the organization was functioning and I didn't 
go into that in great detail. 
page 50 ~ Q. ,vhat was the corporate set-up at that time t 
A. It was a gToup of· independent retailers 
formed together for the purpose-
Mr. :Miller: I object, if Your Honor please, to the witness 
describing· the character of the organization of the corpora-
tion that was organized prior to the existence of this tax 
bill. 
Mr. Gary: May it please Your Honor, we shall show sub-
sequently-
The Court: W'liat difference does it make f 
Mr. Gary: Simply to show the real purpose of the or-
ganization. 
The Court: I don't think that has anything to do with the 
tax. The tax is on what you do. 
Mr. Gary: We are prepared to show that. I think the 
background of the organization does have some bearing. 
The Court: Not with me it l1asn't. It is a question-just 
a narrow line whether you a.re doing· a certain act or series 
of acts. It might be in some cases where you could claim an 
exemption from classification, but I understand that is not 
the case here. 
Mr. Gary: No, we don't claim an exemption. 
page 51 ~ The Court: I think it is irrelevant. 
Bv :M:r. Gary: 
· Q. "Then was the first corporation formed, Mr. Young? 
A. Under the new charter¥ 
Q. Yes, sir. · 
A. I haven't the exaet date before me; it is in the papers 
there. 
Mr. Gary: Can we agree that April 28, 1937, is the date 1 
Mr. Miller: Yes, sir. 
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Mr. Gary: It is agreed that April 28, 1937, is the date of 
the issuance of the new charter. 
Q. "\Vhen that new charter was granted, Mr. Young, was 
the former corporation dissolved'? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the same day? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you what purports to be a copy of the certificate 
of incorporation of .Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated. 
"\iVill you state whether that is. a true copy t 
Mr. Gary, May it please the Court, Mr. Miller has seen 
that copy and we agree it is a copy. 
The Court : That is an· right. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Please file that copy as an exhibit? 
pag·e 52 ~ Note: Filed and marked Exhibit 11. 
Mr. Gary: It is stipulated between counsel that the ex-
hibit is a true copy of the certificate of the corporation. 
The ·witness: Yes, sir, I think that is a true copy of it. 
1\fr. Gary: May it please the Court, the cel'tificate of in-
corporation shows that the charter was issued under Section 
3855 of the Code of Virginia. That Section requires that as-
sociations organized under the act shall have the word '' Co-
operative" as a part of its name. As a matter of fact, the 
Corporation Commission would not permit the use of the 
word "Co-operath1e '' as a part of its name and I have a letter 
here from Mr. N. W. Atkinson, clerk of the Commission which 
states why the word "Co-operative'' does not appear in the 
name, which I desire to introduce at this time. Mr. Miller 
ag·rees it is a copy of tbe letter and I would like to introduce 
it here to save :Mr. Atkinson coming over to testify. 
l\fr. Miller: If Your Honor please, it is agreed this letter , 
and it is admitted in paragraph three of the. City's 
page 53 ~ answer that the allegations with respect to the let-
ter arc true, but it is stated in the answer that the 
alleged reasons for the action of the State Corporation Com-
mission are matters of arg;mnent and not of law and should -
not be required to lJe admitted and I don't think the letter is 
admissible as evidence except the fact there 11as been such a 
ruling by the State Corporation Commission. 
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The Court: I don't see- why that has anything to do with 
this case. 
Mr. Gary: For the $imple fact the act requires the word 
~'Co-operative'' in the name. 
The Court: It doesn't make any difference. If the Cor-
poration Commission says it can go ahead and do business 
without that name, that is all right. 
Mr. Miller: I have no real objection to it. 
The Court: I don't see that has anything to do with the 
case. Mr. Miller claims it is irrelevant, but admits it is a 
copy of the letter if it is relevant. I think it is irrelevant. 
l\fr. Miller: I told Mr. Gary I had no objection to the proof 
of the facts-
page 54 ~ The Court: I don't think it makes a particle of 
difference; just filling up the record. 
Mr .. Gary: It is an exhibit which can be certified here 
separate from the record. The main thing I want when this 
matter goes to the Supreme Court, if it should go there, the 
Supreme Court sees while the act requires the word '' Co-
operative'', why it isn't in the name. ,v e are just trying to 
show why it isn't in there. 
The Court: You can state that at the bar of the Court and 
satisfv them. 
Mr."' Gary: Do I tmderstand-
The Court: I think it is irrelevant for the question here. 
Mr. Gary: I except to that and would like the exception to 
show the letter we attempted to introduce. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit No. 12, rejected. 
Q. Mr. Young, why was the new corporation organized as 
a stock corporation? 
A. As a stock corporation T 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. The members were re~1uired to have a stipulated number 
of shares of stock in the corporation as a pr_e-
pag·e 55 ~ requisite to membership and those stock c.ertificates 
were issued for that purpose with no value. 
Q. The coi·poration had previously been a non-stock cor-
poration, had it nbU 
A. That is right. 
Q. When it was reorganized it was orp:anized under sec-
tion 3855 as a stock corporation. Why did the)r change from 
non-stock to stock~ 
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The Court: What difference does that make as to whether · 
or not this type of business is that of a wholesale merchant 
or a commission merchant t 
Mr. Gary: May it please the Court, I think that has a 
great deal to do with it. 
The Court: The charter speaks for itself as to what tvpe 
of corporation it i~. today. .. 
- Mr. Gary: The fact is they issued the stock because they 
had to do it under the law and I want to put that faet in the 
record. · 
The Court: I can't help that. "\Ve are trying to find out 
whether the corporation under this charter of such-.and-such 
date is doing a business that falls within the category of that 
of a commission merchant or that of a wholesale 
page 56 } merchant and I don't see that has anything to do 
with it. 
Mr. Gary: All rig·ht, sir. 
Q. You stated that a certain number of shares of stock 
were requh~ed as a prerequisite to membership. How many 
shares of stock are required as a prerequisite to member-
ship? 
· A. At the present time? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Five. . 
Q. Now who is the owner of the stock entitled to any voting 
privileges as such in t]1e management of the affairs of the 
association f · 
A. None whatever. 
Q. I say who has the voting power in the association? 
A. In the managemenU 
Q. Yes. . 
A. The board of directors. 
Q. Who has the voting power in the management of the af-
fairs of the association? 
A. The board of directors. Of course, eacl1 member has 
one vote and, if necessary, I think the· charter provides they 
r,an override anv action taken by the board of directors by a 
mnjority vote of the membership. 
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, I don't want to con-
tinue renewing objections, but these are matters 
page 57 } controlled by the by-laws of the corporation and 
those papers speak for themselves and I think this 
witness should be asked to file a copy of the by-laws and let 
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- them speak for themselves and not attempt to tell what his 
recollection of the by-laws is. I object to the line of testi-
mony on that ground. 
The Court: I don't see the reason for it. 
By ]\fr. Gary: 
Q. Now who are the members of the association Y 
A. The members are Independent retail grocers of Rich-: 
mond. 
Q. How many are there at the present time? 
A. 158. 
Q. The application states that there are 144. Have there 
been additions since the application was prepared t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the present time there are 158 2 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many shares of stock of the association are now 
outstandingf 
A. I haven't those figures, 1\fr. Gary. Mr. Whitlock, our 
auditor, can supply that information. 
1 
Mr. Miller: I will stipulate whatever your record shows. 
Mr. Gary: ,,1e will stipulate that the record shows that 
there are 155 members instead of 158, as Mr. Young 
page 58 ~ said, and that there are 539 shares of stock out-
. standing at the present time. 
Mr. Miller: That is all right. 
The Witness: I will correct that statement by saying 158 
stores; 3 have two stores each. That was my error. 
Bv 1\fr. Gary: 
·Q. Is there any stock of the assqciation owned by a non-
member of the association? 
A. None whatever. 
Q. Does any member of the association own more than the 
number of shares of stock required to qualify him for mem-
bership! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are any dividends declared on the stock of the associa-
tion? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I hand you what purports to be a copy of a stock certifi-
cate of the association. Is that a copy of the certificate is-
sued to the stockholders f 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Mr. Gary: vVe offer this in evidence. 
Note : Filed and marked Exhibit No. 13. 
Q. Now, Mr. Young·, how does a person become a member 
of the association} 
page 59 ~ A. They file _an application in which they agree 
to abide by the charter and by-laws and deposit 
with the organization the sum of $505.00, $5.00 as a member-
ship fee, and in this application they agree to surrender any 
store identification when they terminate their membership. 
Q. When this application is filed what is done with iU 
A. It is presented to the board of direcfors and they are 
accepted into memben~hip by a majority vote of the board 
after being investigated. 
Q. I hand you what purports to be a statement of applica,. 
tion for membership. Is that a copy f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Note: Filed and marked as Exhibit No. 14. 
Q. Is there any contract between the association and its 
members other than the agTeement of the member as stated 
in the application for membership to abide by the charter 
and by-laws of the association ancl other proper rules and 
reg·ulations adopted by the board of directors or the members 
of the association? 
A. No, sir, that is the only written contract. 
l\fr. Gary: May it please the Court, at this point I would 
like to present as an exhibit the by-laws of the Richmond 
Food Stores, Incorporated. 
Mr. ~filler: I admit that is a true copy. 
page 60 ~ :Mr. Gary: I ask that be admitted hy stipulation 
of counsel. 
Note: Filed and marked as Exhibit No. 15. 
Q. Does the associatio11 conduct affairs in absolute accord 
with its charter and by-laws 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Docs your association sell any goods, wares and mer-
chandise to non-members of the association? 
A. :N"o, sir. · , 
Q. The by-laws of the association provide that the rig·ht to 
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purchase through the association shall be limited to members 
and is not transferable and that no member shall be allowed 
or permitted to sell any merchandise purchased through the 
association except in the reg·ular course of his retail ·business 
and that any member found guilty of selling goods pur-
chased through the association to non-members or otherwise 
disposing of merchandise except through the reg·ular course 
of his business shall be subject to a fine of not less than $25.00 
nor more than $50.00 for each separate violation. Is this 
provision of the by-laws enforced by the association t 
A. Yes, sir, fully. · 
Q. Fully enforced f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now what privileges do the members of the 
page 61 ~ association enjoy? 
A. They enjoy the privilege of buying-of se-
curing their requirements at a fixed mark-up and the adver-
tising which we run in the local papers free to the member-
ship and such other advantages that accrue through the as-
sociation and are passed along to them. ·we assess them no 
dues for the purpose of advertising; that money is all secured 
from manufacturers. 
Q. Now what profit does the association make on its op-
erations? . 
A. It has a 4% mark-up. 
Q. ·when you say it has a 4% mark-up, to what do you re-
fer? 
. A. ·well, I might describe it this way, that if an item cost 
$1.00 and carries a 2% cash discount, our members can buy 
that merchandise for $1.02. We add 4% which we consider 
sufficient to defray the extent of handling· this merchandise 
for the membership. 
Q. In other wo1·ds, when you buy goods for your members 
you add to the price that you pay for the goods a 4% mark-up 
and-they pay the cost of the goods to the association plus the 
4%? 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Q. Now how is that 4% arrived at? 
A. We have the manufacturer's. inYoice and it is a ver~" 
simple matter-
page 62 ~ Q. I mean how did the association agree on the 
mark-up of 4%, 
A. Because many other groups in the country were op-
erating successfully on that basis and we made the same 
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flexible so if we couldn't do it we could increase the mark-up. 
Q. What is the purpose of that mark-up 1 . 
A. To defray the expenses of the association. 
Q. Does the asso~iation attempt to make any profit at all 
on the operation f 
A. None whatever. It was never set up for that purpose. 
Q. What is the purpose for which it is set up t 
A. Up until 1935-
l\fr. Miller: I object to what took place up to 1935. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
A. (Continue.d) Well, then, it was set up to save the inde-
pendent groc.er from ruinous c.ompetition. Their existence 
was at stake and they couldn't meet competition at the prices 
they were paying prior to this time and any mark-up in re-
sale price that was made had to be made by the small retailer. 
He wasn't getting any assistance from any other stores. Thou-
sands of them all over the countrv went out of business be-
cause of corporate chain competition and they were forced 
through necessity to have a set-up of this nature 
page 63 ~ so they might get their merchandise at a prJce 
which would enable them to meet this competition~ 
Q. In other words, to enable them to buy .h~ larger quan-
tities, a group:--
Mr. Miller: If Your Honor please, I think the counsel is 
leading the witness. I think that is_ the issue. 
Mr. Gary: Strike it out. 
Q. Now in the event the 4% mark-up amounts a year to 
more than the operating expenses of the association, what dis-
position is niade of the surplus 1 . 
A. A record is kept of each member's purcliases and at 
the end of each year this net overcharg·e is credited to the 
account of the various members based on their purchases for 
that vear. 
Q. ·suppose it amounts to less than the operating expenses; 
what disposition is made of the deficit? 
A. They are charged proportionately with the amount of 
. t]1e deficit. 
Mr. Miller: I object until it is shown there has )Jeen such 
a defi.cit or reason fo1· such an assessment. The witness has 
not testified there has been any deficit and he is assuming 
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to .say what might be done under peculiar circum-
page 64 ~ stances. There is no evidence the conditions that 
are· 'the basis for the question have eyer yet ex-
isted. 
Mr. Gary: -May it please the Court, this is the executive 
secretary of the association. He is testifying as to the opera-
tion of the association. 
The Court: He could not go any-farther than the by-laws 
and that is already in the record. What is the use of explain-
ing that t 
Mr. Gary: Frankly, I am not certain there is any pro-
vision made in the by-laws for a deficit. 
Mr. Miller: That is the reason I made the objection. 
Mr. Gary: I am not certain on that point 
The Court: Then he might guess right or might not. 
:.Mr. Gary: I don't know whether they have any· minutes 
of that kind or any records. 
The Witness: )Ve did have a deficit the first-a portion of 
the first year we operated and that was charged to the mem-
bership. 
Mr. Miller: What vear was thaU 
The Witness: 1935: the first four months. 
Mr. Miller: I object to that and move that the 
pag·e 65 ~ testirµony in that respect be stricken out. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Gary: Vl e except. 
The Court: We are not interested in anything prior to 1937. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Mr. Young, have you read the application filed in this 
case l:or the correction of the city wholesale merchant's license 
taxes assessed ag·ainst this associatiou 1 
A. Have I read whaU 
Q. The application filed in this ,case for the correction of 
the city wholesale merchant's license tax assessed against 
the association? 
A. I am not positive, Mr. Gary, that I have. (Witness ex-
amines application.) Yes, sir, I read that. 
Q. Does that application correctly state the facts with 
reference to the operation, conduct and management of the 
affairs of the association f 
Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please. 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Mr. Millee: I object because I don't think the question 
is sufficiently specific. to · enable the witness to give a certain 
answer to it. Thero are certain allegations in here that are 
matters of law or conclusions of law and not mat-
page 66 ~ ters of fact and this witness should not be called 
upon to answer it. 
Mr. Gary: I did not ask the witness any conclusions of 
law; I asked him does that application correctly state the 
facts. That is all I have asked him, with reference to the op-
eration, conduct and management of the affairs of the associa-
tion. 
The Court: All right, sir; he may answer it. 
A. Yes, sir, it does. 
Q. Are all of the facts stated in that application true and 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The Court: With the exception of those you have stated 
were wrongt 
Mr. Gary: Yes, sir, which have already been explained. 
Q. Mr. Young, you have stated something about the service 
that is giyen in advertising. Does your association advertise 
for the stores as a whole f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How is that done 1 
A. A weekly bulletin is sent out to the membership, notify-
ing them of the items which will appear in the newspapers 
... on Friday. A tear sheet from the newspaper ad i~ 
page 67 ~ mailed out from the Times Dispatch Thursday 
night and in the paper on Friday morning· the ad 
appears and the membership are required as nearly as pos-
sibly to have all of that merchandise in stock. 
Q. Does that advertisement state the prices at which va-
rious articles ,vi11 be sold in the various Richmond Food 
Stores on that date? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And does it state it will be sold in all of the Richmond 
Food Stores at that pric.e on that day 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you a copy of one of those advertisements¥ 
Note : Advertisement produced. 
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Q. Now that says: "Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated.'' 
Does that give the prices of those articles in each of the mem-
ber's stores of the Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated? 
A. Yes, sir, each store carries the same identification and 
we request the publie to eall my office for store-locations, so 
that if they are interested at the time in the store in that 
neighborho9d we will give them the address and phone num-
ber. That appears in every ad. 
Q. Who sells these articles at these prices¥ 
A. Every member of our group. 
Q. Does the association make any sales at all in accordance 
with these advertisements 1 
page 68 ~ A. The warehouse 1 
Q. Yes. 
A. It supplies merchandise. 
Q. The association? 
A. It supplies the merchandise. 
Q. Sold throug·h the merchants, the individual merchants? 
A. That is right, with the exception of fresh meats. We 
don't handle fresh meats. 
Q. Your organization, the association, does not handle any 
fresh meats at allf · 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Gary: We offer that ad in evidence. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit No. 16. 
Mr. Gary: Will it be understood that we just introduce tbe 
ad and not the whole paper 1 
Mr. Miller : Right. 
CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
Bv Mr. Miller: 
.. Q. I understood you to say your corporation made a profit.; 
is that right? 
A. I said it was not set up for the purpose of making any 
profit. 
Q. Does it make a profit? 
A. No, sir, it makes no profit. 
page 69 ~ Q. Does your balance sheet and operating- ex-
. pense show a profit f · 
A. It shows a net overcharge. 
Q. That is, the difference between the cost of the merchan-
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dise and the operating· expenses on one hand and the receipts 
from the sales of the merchandise on the other; is that rio·ht 7 
A. That is rig·ht. 0 
Q. What was the total amount of merchandise sold by the 
corporation in 1938 f 
A. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Miller. 
Mr. Gary: Mr. Whitlock is here and he handles those fig-
ures. I will put Mr. Whitlock on the stand. · 
Bv Mr~ ]\filler : 
.. Q. One of the allegations of fact in the petition found in 
parag·raph 4 thereof is this: '' The stock issued by the ap- . 
plicant has practically no yalue other than that of providing 
the prerequisite required for membership in the association." 
Is that correct1 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You have seen the auditor's report and the balance sheet 
of December 31, 1938, haven't you t . · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And after examination of that you still think 
page 70 ~ the stock has no value? 
A. It has no value. 
Q. It shows assets of approximately $71,000.00, total cur-
rent assets on December 31, 1938, and the liabilities-current 
liabilities total around $25,000.00 in rouud figures and there 
are no other liabilities except the reserve for contingencies 
of $1,925.00 and an item carried as capital, consisting of mem-
bership subscriptions ·and overcharges to b~ distributed in 
membership certificates totaling $47,250.00 of fixed liabilities 
and $1,925.00 of conting·ent liabilities; wouldu 't there he more 
than enoug·h to pay off that stock? 
A. l\fr. Miller, I would appreciate it if you would let Mr. 
Whitlock answer those questions. I am no auditor and no 
bookkeeper and he is thoroughly familiar with that. 
Q. But you have attempted to say the stock is of practically 
no value. You mean you are not qualified to answer that ques-
tion, do you not? 
A. Well, it was agreed that the stock would have no value 
except as a prerequisite to membership. 
Q. Agreed between whom 1 
A. In this charter that was written up. I think you will 
find it in there. 
Q. Will you look at it and find out what you have in mind-
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the copy of the certificate of incorporation? I 
page 71 ~ don~t know just what you have in mind. 
, A. When we said it had no value, we meant it-
that we couldn't sell it. 
Q. That is all you meant f 
A. That they couldi1 't sell it. 
Q. It has no ready market value because you can't go out 
on the market and buy it because it requires the approval of 
the board of directors before one can become a member; is 
that what you mean 1 
A. Yes, sir, and the stock has to be offered to the associa-
tion; that it has no market value and could not be sold. 
Q. w·ho handles the buying and selling; Mr. 'Whitlock or 
you! 
A. WhatY 
Q. The buying· and sellingf 
A. Mr. Whitlock. 
Q. Where is your place of bushiess f 
A. 16th and Grace Streets. 
Q. What is the approximate floor space down theref 
A. I think 27,000 feet. 
Q. How many employees do you have¥ 
A. I would have to count them up, if you will give me a 
minute. ' 
Q. If you will relate the oharacter of the employees and 
give me the general number, that would answer my purpose. 
H9w many officers are there 0/ 
pag·e 72 } .A.. Four officers. 
· Q. Actively engaged in the business f 
A. Five officers with myself. 
Q. .All of them actively engaged in the business 1 
A. vVell, they give very little time to .it. Our president de-
votes some time to it, but the other three officers do not. 
Q. vVho are the officers that do devote time to itf 
A. S. B. Evans, president, and Irving- :Meyer, vice-presi-
dent, Mr. ·Whitlock and myself. 
Q. How many stenographers and clerks do you havef 
A. vVe have no stenographers, have three clerks-four 
clerks with the bookkeeper. 
Q. How many trucks do you have 1 
A. Five,. isn't iU-yes, five. 
Q. Five drivers? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You buy merchandise and store it clown there until it is 
wanted by the retail stores 1 
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.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you make delive'ries of merchandise'1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I understand you don't deliver all but you do deliver 
some merchandisef 
A. ,Ve deliver a considerable portion of it. 
page 73 ~ Many of the members haul their whole merchan-
dise. 
Q. They can come down there and get it and pay for it and 
walk awayf 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is there a loading platform there 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or facilities for· loading· merchandise 1 
A. Yes, sir, doors; that is all. 
Q. \Vhat character of merchandise do you carryf Is that 
som~thing you are familiar with or Mr. Whitlock, as to the 
general character of the articles f 
A. vVell, the stock is complete. 
Q. You .carry everything that retail merchants generally 
carry in the City1 
A. As nearly as possible. 
Q. Broomsf 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Articles that are entirely separate from food such as 
brooms, and matches and toilet paper and things of that char-
acter generally carried by merchants J 
A. Tubs and washboards, etc. 
Q. You are general merchants, are you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with the character of the orders that 
. are given to the pro'clucers or manufacturers or is 
page 7 4 ~ nfr. Whitlock f 
A. Mr. vYhitlock is the huyer and handles all of 
that. He knows far more about it than I do. 
RE-DIR.ECT EXA1\UNATI0N. 
Bv Mr. Garv: 
· "Q. l\fr. Miller asked you if yon bought merchandise auq 
stored it for your members. Now upon what basis do you buy 
your merchandise, Mr. Young? 
A. \Ve have a contact man who covers these stores every 
two weeks and attempts to anticipate their needs and it is from 
ten to :fifteen specialty salesmen representing the manuf ac-
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turers who cover these stores every day. They take orderi:; 
from the retailers and. these orders are broug·ht to us for our 
okay and our buyer buys merchandise based on this survey 
of our contact man and the orders received daily from spe-
cialty salesmen. The major portion of it is all on the basis 
of that activity. 
Q. In other words, the manufacturers with whom you deal 
have their salesmen go around to the stores and take orders 
from each individual merchant? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And when those orders are taken you say they are 
brought to you 'i 
A. Yes, sir, they are brought to the shipping de-
page 75 ~ partment. 
Q. I mean to the association? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the association places an order using· as its basis 
these orders which have been turned oyer by the manufac-
turers' salesmen. Now when the manufacturers' salesmen . 
take those orders do they have more than one co.py of the 
order? 
A. They have three. 
Q. What are done with those three copies? 
A. One we okay that goes to the manufacturers, one we keep 
and the thin copy remains in the salesman's order book. 
Q. Then the goods as shown by those orders is that shipped 
to you in bulk f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then what do you do with it when it comes into the 
store? 
A. Those orders are ,filed-they are filed alphabetically 
in each member's name. 
Q. You then distribute the merchandise to the merchants _ 
with the 4% mark-up as you have stated before 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. l\farking it up 4-% over what it is billed to you? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now Mr. l\Iiller asked you if you were not general mer-
chai;its. I imagine he was ref erring to the Richmond Food 
Stores. Is the Richmond Food Stores a merchant at all? 
page 76 ~ Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please. That 
is a conclusion of law and not a question of fact. 
The witness sfates what they do. 
Mr. Gary: You will admit then the question you asked him 
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is a conclusion of law. You asked him if he wasn't doing the 
business of a general merchant. If you will admit that is a 
conclusion of law, which I think it is, I won't ask the question. 
The Witness: I thought he had ref erenee to the ·individual 
stores. 
Mr. Gary: Exac.tly. . 
The Court : I thoug·ht he meant the question to mean the 
type of-the unlimited supply for retail stores of different 
grades and quantities of goods. TJiat is what I took it to 
mean. 
By Mr. Gary:: 
Q. Let me ask you this. Do you handle any merchandise 
which is not handled by retaU grocers f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So that you handle only the classes. of merchandise that 
are regularly sold in a retail grocery store 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. I believe you stated that you do not handle fresh meats? 
A. We do not handle any perishables except 
page 77 ~ vegetables; don't handle cheese, butter, eggs, u~eat, 
~tc. . 
Q. Then you handle those commodities which are usually 
sold in the retail grocery store except fresh meats, poultry, 
eggs, butter, cheese, etc.''? 
.A.. Yes. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
Bv Mr. Miller! 
• Q. You do handle also the same character and quality goods 
that are handled by wholesale merchants generally in the 
City of Richmond, do you not? 
A. I am not familim· with their stocks, Mr. Miller. I haven't 
called on a wholesaler here in ten years and I couldn't say 
just what the comparison would be. We handle what our 
members request; it is based larg·cly on their requests. 
Q. Do you have a form of order that is used by the sales-
men of the manufacturers when they go around to call on 
retail merchants! 
A. Does the manufacturers' salesmen have it or we, do you 
mean1 ' 
Q. Does anybody have it? Are those orders taken on a 
particular kind of form? 
A. A reg·ular order book. 
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Q. Are they yours or the manufacturer's? 
A. The mam1facturer 's. 
Q. Have you got any such copies 1 
page 78 ~ A. We have got a file full of them at the ware-
house ; -haven't any here. 
IVIr. :Miller: I thought Mr. Gary and I had agreed they 
would produce for the City all forms that were used in this 
business to save the City the necessity of issuing a subpoena 
duces tec·um, and those forms haven't been exhibited and I 
would like to have the opportunity of examining those forms 
and introducing them in evidence if it is practicable to do so. 
Can you get them J 
l\fr. Gary: ,v e have no objection to giving you those forms, 
but they are not our forms. I told you we would produce 
any fonns we had. They are not our forms; they are the 
manufacturers' forms. ·what do vou want? 
Mr. Miller: Whatever forms ·a1·e in use. 
Mr. Gary: He said there were between ten and fifteen of 
those salesmen. 
The ·witness: Pardon me for interrupting, the salesmen 
are required to ha:ve them. The man going to take an order 
without an oi·der book woulcl be fired by wire. 
Mr. Miller: That is wby I thought it was im-
. page 79 ~ portant to have all the forms used by the corpora-
tion. 
The Witness: It is not given by us; it is made by the 
manufacturers. 
Bv<l\fr. Miller: 
• Q. Who signs those orders? 
A. When they bring us a copy we stamp his c.opy showing 
it is accepted. His boss requires him to send it in signed; 
otherwise, he could go ahead and write up a lot of phoney 
orders. 
Q. Do the retail merchants sig1.1 those orders¥ 
A. Y cs. Then we have to okay the copy. 
Q. I understood this form I have in my hand was the only 
form signed by anybody with respect to sales to retail mer-
chants? 
A. No, sir, that is a sales ticket. 
Mr. Gary: There are no sales ticket. These are the orders 
they give to the manufacturer. It is put on this form when 
it is shipped to them. 
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Mr. Miller: Can I get half a dozen of those forms t 
The Witness: If His Honor will permit me to do so, I will 
phone down. 
l\Ir. Miller: Are you familiar with this form 
page 80 ~ here 1 
· The ·witness: Mr. Whitlock made that up. I 
don't know a whole lot about it. 
Mr. Miller: Now I sugg·est we let Mr. Young withdraw 
from the stand with the privilege on the part of the City to 
call him again after these forms are obtained and let him get 
the forms. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 81 ~ FRANK "\V. vVHITLOCK, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. Mr. vVhitlock, state your name ,and occupation, please. 
A.. Frank vV. vVhitlock; buyer and manager for Richmond 
Food Stores, Incorporated. 
Q. How long have you been with the Richmond Food Stores, 
Incorporated! 
A.. I opened tl1e stores the first day they sta rted----,Septem-
ber 16, 1935. 
Q. Do you have charge of the books of the association 1 
A. Well, up to some time ago I did all of it, all of the 
accounting· practically, but now I have a bookkeeper. 
Q. Is the bookkeeper under you 1 ~ 
A.. Yes. sir. 
Q. So you have charge of the supervision of the book-
keeping1 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. Now, l\Ir. vVbitlock, will you state to the court just how 
the Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, operates? 
A. How it operates 1 
Q. Yes. 
pag·e 82 ~ A. ,v e operate as a cooperative grocer. 
Q. :Mr. Young sfated that the variom; manufac-
turers send around their ag·ents or salesmen to take orders. 
Diel you hear Mr. Young's statement as to tliaU 
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A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Is thata correct statement of the general method of 
which ·f ou operate¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now does the association operate at a profiH 
A. No; sir. 
Q. I hand you what purpQrts to be the balance sheet of the 
association as of December 31, 1938, the operating statement 
for the year ended December 31, 1938, and the balance sheet 
of the advertising fund as of December 31, 1938, and the 
cash receipts and disbursements of the advertising fund for 
the year ending Decembe1· 31, 1938, and similar statements 
for the year ending December 31, 1937, and for December 31, 
1936, for the year 1936. Will you examine those state-
ments and state whether they are true copies of the state-
ments which they purport to l}ef 
Mr. Miller: I will admit that if you want it. 
Mr. Gary: It is stipulated by counsel that the exhibits 
are true copies of the statements which they purport to rep-
resent. · 
Q. By whom are thqse statements prepared? 
page 83 ~ A. A. M. Pullen & Company. 
Q. Are A. M. Pullen auditors for Richmond 
}i'ood Stores, Incorporated f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Note: The three statements filed and marked Exhibits 
Nos. 17, 18 and 19, respectively. 
Q. In the balance sheet for 1938 there appears an item of 
assets. notes receivable, members, past. due, $1,170.00; not 
due $20,296.50, making a total of $41,466.50, loans discounted 
at bank $21,296.50. making a balance of $1,170.00. Now will 
you explain that item? 
A. That is the amount of notes that we have taken for 
our members-from our members and ·discounted at the bank. 
Q. Taken from the members for what? 
A. To buy capital in the Richmond Food Stores, Incorpo-
rated. 
Q. Are those notes tlie amounts due for shares of stock pur-
ch::ise<l as a pre1·eouisite to members11ip in the association? 
A. Th::it is ri!tht, yes, sir. Some of them paid cash, and 
some paid by notes and we discounted the notes. 
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Q. Now I notice, on the liability side you have members 
advances; what does that represent-$4,000.00 accrued in-
terest $122.00. 
A. Members, advances 7 
page 84 ~ Q. Yes, sir. 
A. That is what we had to borrow from the 
members at various times, in order to have working capital .. 
Q. In other words, that is a loan from some of the members Y 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. :Made· to the association 1 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have. an item due to members pro rata distribution 
of overcharges for the years ·ended December 31, 1936, 1937 
and 1938, $14,805.86, less overcharges to be distributed in 
membership certificates, $4~600.00. Will you explain that 
item! 
A. Which one f 
Q. Both of them? 
A. Well, the $14,805.86 is the amount that has been credited 
to each member we have overcharged for those years, and 
that is set up on the books as a liability due these members 
because we are not supposed to work on a profit and have 
overcharged them that amount and if any member decides 
to withdraw I will bave to give it back to him. 
Q. So that is the amount set up to the credit of each mem-
ber! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For his proportionate overcharges for those years? 
A. Tliat is right. . 
page 85 } Q. ·w1ia.t does the $4,600.00 item of overcharges 
to be distributed in membership certificate mean! 
A. Vv ell, some time ago the corp01·ation decided that $300.00 
wouldn't be enough in order to buy merchandise for our 
members. 
Q. $300.00 from each member you mean? 
A. Yes, sir, would not be enoug·h to buy merchandise and 
we decided to raise the amount to $500.00 and we also said 
that the old members would be allowed to use part 0£ their 
overcharg-es in bring;ing their capital up to $500.00. but ·any 
new member would have to put. up all of the $500.00 at once. 
Q. At that time, did you chang·e tl1e prerequisite stock 
ownershin of stock from three shnres to five? 
A. Yes, sir, we changed from three to five. . 
Q. Now how many shares of stock do you require of a 
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new member c9miug into the organization to take out at the 
present time? 
A. Five shal·es. 
Q. Did you require· the old members to immediately to take 
out two more shares when that change was made 1 
A. No, sir, those, that had as much as $200.00 in their over-
charge account we immediately issued a sto"bk certificate for 
their part. · If any member didn't have enough, 
page 86 ~ why we didn't assess him for any additional 
amount, but ag-reed to wait until it did reach that 
amount, if it did. 
Q. To wait until the amount in their overcharge account 
accumulated to $200.001 
A. Yesl sir. 
Q. Then the $4,000.60 represents tlw shares of stock which 
have been issued from those accumulations in accordance 
with that particular plan? 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Q. Have yon issued any member more than the two shares 
of stock required to bring his stock ownership up to five 
sharesf 
A. More than two shares f 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir; it wouldn't be necessary to do that because 
they paid in their $300.00 to start with. 
Q. Does any member of the association own more than 
five shares of stock 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Is any stock owned by non-members of the association? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Now at the bot.tom you have contingent liabilities, notes 
receivable, discounted at tlle bank $20,296.50, which appears 
to be the same item a.ppearing- in the assets un-
page 87 ~ der notes receivable, members. What does that 
item represent f 
A. You mean at the bottom f 
Q. Yes . 
.A. That is merely a notation put on all reports made for 
credit reasons to show what your contingent liabilities would 
be. , 
Q. "7Jiat does tlmt item represent? 
A. ThiR particular item of $20,296.50 represents notes that 
we ]1ave discounted at the bank with our endorsement. 
Q. What notes 1 
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A. Notes that we have taken from the members. 
Q. Notes from the members. That is the same notes you 
have taken for membership from the members that they have 
given you the notes on their stock and you have discounted 
those notes at the bank and obtained the money on them 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. So that the bank holds the notes and you carry the 
items in your assets and also show in your liabilities that _ 
you would have that contingent liability in the event the mem-
ber does not pay 1 
A. vVell, we carry it in the assets and also show right 
following the same amount of notes discounted, which off-
sets each other. 
Q. Now in the opera.ting statement for the year 
page 88 ~ ended December, 31, 1938, you show there sales 
·$501,026.27. '\Vhat does that item represent? 
A. That represents the amount of g·oods that we have dis-
tributed to our members. 
Q. During the year 19381 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now I notice you designate that as sales. Is there any 
particular reason for designating that as sales V 
A. No, sir. It is more or less an accounting procedure in 
opening up a set of books. 
Q. Didn't you open up the set of books f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time that designation was made was there any 
coni::iideration given to the question as to whether these 
transactions were sales or whethel' it was merely a method 
of distribution! 
A. "'\Vell, the whole set-up as far as the books were concerned 
was left to me because they knew I had had f)Uite a. bit of 
experience in ace.ountin~; and they lulCl no objection to the 
w;:iv I opened up the books, providing I knew what I was 
doing·. 
Q. "Well. whv did vou select the vrnr<l "sales" f 
A. Because h1 Rtuclying· accounting that is the accounting 
term to use, purclrnses and sales. 
· Q. So you selected it as an accounting term 
pag·e 89 ~ rather t1um show anv rc:tl nature of the transac-
tion so far as this association is concerned 1 
A. Sure. . 
0. Now vou show a gross margin 011 sales of $26,389.25. 
which is 4.79 percentage of your sales. It lias been ·testified 
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that you have a mark-up of 4% on your goods. Will you state 
why it is that figure happens to be 4.Wf 
A. vVell, we delivered quite a good bit of goods to our 
members and in doing so we charged them 4% and then in 
figuring the percentage in order for our warehouse to break 
even we took all fractions in order to make it more simple 
and that bas. a tendency to increase your mark-up that much. 
·we don't use any fractions in billing. 
Q. Now you do have a 1% drayage or delivery charge¥ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is that in addition to your 4% ! 
A. Yes, sir. We put that on there in order to g·et the work 
done. If we di<ln 't have it on, why all the members would 
require deliveries and we couldn't do it. 
Q. If a member sends for the goods, he pays 4% ? 
A. That is right. 
Q. If you deliver them to him at his place of business, you 
mark it up 5%; 4% the regular mark-up and 1 % drayage f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. That is the 1 % figured in here, which has a 
page '90 ~ tendency to bring your percentage up over the 4% 
marg'in? 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Q. Now this operating statement shows a net overcharge 
from operations of $7,641.63, which after certain other ad-
justments shows a total net overcharge for the period of 
$7,861.13? 
A. That is right. 
0. What was done with that overcharge? 
A. ·wen, it was worked down according to percentage that 
you see on the right and then that percentage was :figured 
on each amount of g·oods that were distributed to eacl1 mem-
ber. ·whatever the results was, it was credited to his account 
as an overcl1arge to him for that particular year. 
Q. Do~s the corporation consider that as profit? 
A. No, sir. If any member should withdraw today, I will 
l1ave to give it back to him. 
Bv l\f r. Miller : 
··o. Give what back? 
A. This overcharge. 
By Mr. Gary: 
Q. ·when is tliat credit made to his accounU 
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A~· It is made to him at the end of the accounting year. 
Q. Credited on each member's account? 
A. Each account. 
page 91 } Q. At the end of the calendar year¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe you said when the credit in any old mem-
ber's account reached over $200.00 and he has not but 3 shares 
of stock then you issue him 2 additional shares of stock for 
that amount? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does the association make any profit f 
A. None whatever, no, sir .. 
Q. Now what is this advertising fund! 
A. Mr. Young is more familiar with that than I am, but I 
will make an effort to answer some of the questions. We 
have an advertising. department and Mr. Young is in charge 
of it which enables us to run these ads each week. It is en-
tirely separate from this organization. 
Q. Y.ou mean the funds are kept separate from the other 
funds? 
A. Yes,. sir, the whole operation is kept separate. It is 
an advertising department. 
Q. This shows receipts of approximately $10,700.00 for 
the year 1938. ·where do those receipts come from 1 
A. Thev come from various manufacturers. 
Q. The .. manufacturers pay the association to advertise 
their brands f 
A. Yes, sir, that is rig·ht. 
Q. And they are advertised in these newspaper advertise-
ments. 
page 92 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there any profit made on that depart-
ment t 
A. No, sir. The Robertson-Pat.tman Bill states the money 
received from advertisers lms to be spent. 
Q. The Robertson-Pattman Bill, you mean that is the ,F'ed-
eral ]aw? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Governing- advertising? 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. They require all money put into that advertising fund 
~lrnll be spent for advertising! -
A. That is rig-ht. 
Q. Tl1erefore, the association 11as to spend all of the money 
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put into that -fund there for the expense of ope1:ating the 
advertising· department and the advertisements that the as-
sociation puts out. 
A. That is right. 
Q. So the association gets none of it whatever·¥ 
A. No, sir, none whatever. 
Q. It is an entirely separate fund kept separate from the 
other funds of the association¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Stands absolutely on its own footing! 
A. That is right. 
Q. l\fr. Whitlock, Mr. Miller asked Mr. Young 
pag-e 93 ~ the question as to whether this stock of the as-
sociation has anv valuet 
A. It has the par value of $100.00 a share when it is origi-
nally issued, but does not have any value to anyone on the 
outside of the organization. 
(~. vVhy do you say it has no value to anyone on the out-
side of the organization? 
A. Because if they had it they couldn't buy any merchan-
d~e. . · 
Q. Does the stock itself pay any dividends Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Can the person sell the stock? 
A. Not unless he offers it to the corporation first. 
Mr. Miller: All of that is in the by-laws and constitu-
tion. 
Mr. Gary: You questioned whether it had some value. I 
just want to show the facts. 
Q. Mr. Miller asked l\fr. Young· to obtain copies of certain 
orders taken by various salesmen representing the manu-
facturers from the various members of the association. Have 
yon secured copies of those orders? 
A. These arc the copies tlrnt I have received. These are 
orhdnal copies. 
Q. They arc original copies of what? 
A. Of the orders that the manufacturers have received 
for us to supnl:v our mercliants with these particular amounts 
of merchandise. 
1Jage 94 ~ Q. Are tl1ey a 11 of the orders you have? 
A. No, sir. If they were, I would have to close 
up. 
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Q. They .are just samples taken at random from the files Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you introduce those as exhibits f 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit No. 20. 
Q. Does the association in itself have any forms 1 
A. They have one or two forms, yes, sir; they have a let-
terhead. 
Q. Is this a copy of the letterhead of the association? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Note: Filed and marked Exhibit No. 21. 
Q. Is this another form used by the association f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please state what that is 1 
A. This is the form we use to write down their require-
ments for delivery. 
Q. ·who prepared this form? 
A. I think the Baltimore Book Sales Company. 
Q. I notice this form has the heading ''Sold to". Has that 
any particular significance? 
A. No, sir. They have quite a few fo1·ms for their ma-
chines or the forms are aiready set up by numben and all you 
have to do is to order a particular form that will give you 
~mfficient lines and spaces. 
page 95 ~ Q. It also has on there "Terms". Do you have 
any terms on your goods? 
A. All our goods are sent out on cash basis. 
Q. Do· you sell any item whatever on credit, on terms? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Your entire business is clone on an absolute cash basis 
with vom· members? 
A. ·Absolutely. 
Q. This then is a memorandum used by you to jot down 
and keep track of the amount of goods distributed to your 
members1 
A. That is right. 
Q. Do you use these forms in duplicate or triplicate f 
A. "\Ve use them in triplicate. 
Q. "\Vliat are done with the various copies? 
A. "\V ell, we write their requirements un on three forms; 
that is, an original and two carbons at the same time and 
the white copy is kept in the office, the yellow copy given 
80 Supreme Court of ..Appeals of Virginia 
Frank W. Whitlock. 
to our member and their requirements is gotten. up by this 
pink form. · 
Q. That is given to the man who makes up the order¥ 
A. ·who gets it up. 
Note: 1n1ed and marked as Exhibit No. 22. 
Q. Do you also have charge of the distribution of the 
goods-supervise the distribution of goods to the mem-
bers? 
page 96 ~ A. In getting up their requirements 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir. We have one head shipping clerk and three 
clerks to take down their requirements-write them down. 
Q. Are any goods sold or distributed to persons who are 
not members of the association? 
A. No, sir, none whatever. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Are all of the goods that are sold sold upon the basis 
of orders similar to these, filed by you as your exhibit? 
A. I clidn 't get the first part of your question. 
Note: Question read. 
Mr. Gary: I object to the use of the term "sold" unless 
it is understood he is using it without any legal significance. 
It is our claim, of course, these goods are not sold; they 
are distributed to the members. It is a buying organization 
by and for its members and I object to the question on that 
basis. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Gary: Exception. 
Bv Mr. Miller: 
~ Q. Will you answer that now, please? 
A. ·would you mind stating that question again 1 
. Q. Are all of the goods that are sold sold upon 
page 97 ~ the basis of orders similar to these filed by you 
as your exhibit? -
A. We don't have any sales force at all; we don't sell any 
goods. 
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Q. .A.re all of the goods that pass through the Richmond 
lf ood Stores, Incorporated, 1Varehouse handled on the basis 
of orders similar to these orders that are filed by you as 
your exhibits? 
A. No, sir.; quite a few of them are phoned in by our mem-
bers direct. -
Q. Do you keep any record showing· in your sales what 
portion of those sales items are represented by orders that . 
are phoned in by your retailers as distinguished from orders 
signed by your retailers 1 
A. "\Ve don't try to separate our billings, no, sir. All 
the merchandise distributed is kept in the same way, regard-
less of how the order is taken. 
Q. If I were a retail merchant in the City of Richmond 
and a member of your association and wanted a case of 
canned g·oods, couldn't I phone to you and say: ''Send to 
me a case of canned goods'' f 
A. Yes,· sir, if you were a member. 
Q. Would you then send them 1 
A. Yes, sir, if you were a member. 
Q. Where would you get that case of canned goods i 
· A. Where would I p;et iU 
page 98 } Q .. Yes, in order to fill that order. 
A. I would get it from the manufacturer who 
packed it, what~ver kind you wanted. , 
Q. Suppose you had a case of those canned goods in stock, 
would vou take it out of stock and send it to me? 
A. If I had the case in stockt 
Q. Yes. 
A. Sure. That is what I maintain a warehouse for, to keep 
the goods there. 
Q ..... Evcn though I badn 't: previously given you a signed or-
der for those g·oods Y 
A. No, sir, you don't have to give signed orders. 
Q. Or even thoug·h I lmdn 't ~ previously given a verbal or-
der for the particular item Y 
A. The goods would be there and you would get them, if I 
lrnd them. 
Q. vVl1ere do you get all that surplus stock of those orders 
in voln warehouse Y 
A. I buv it. 
Q. You ·buy it outright from the producers and manufac-
turers? 
A.. Yes. 
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Q. Without any orders from retail merchants previously 
~ven~yout -
A. vVell, tbere are quite a few items I will buy 
page 99' ~ alo1)g each day and then there are some I would 
buy based entirely on the work that you see therep 
Q. On December 31, l938, you had a merchaudise inven-
tory of $48,487 .G3 at cost, did you not¥ 
A. Cost or market, whichever was lower. 
Q. It is carried on· the inventory as at cosU 
A. \Vell-
Q. ,vhich is rig·htf 
A. vVell~ it was figured at cost or market, whichever was 
lower. 
Q. A. l\L ·Pullen & Company has made an audit showing it 
was at cost; is that righU 
A. vVell, I priced the inventory and it was fixed at cost 
or market, whichever was lower. 
Q. Can yon say to what extent that merchandise represents 
merchandise embraced in orders similar to these exhibits 
filed by you f 
.A.. AJI of it. 
Q. All of itf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So that every bit of that inventory had been previously 
ordered by retail merchants f 
A. No, sir. I said similar merchandise to that. I didn't 
say they had previously ordered it. 
( Question read as follows) 
.:~: ! '. 
page 100 ~ Q. So that every bit of tl1at inventory had been 
previously ordered by retail merchants f 
A. No, I didn't. say that. I misunderstood you. I said the 
merchandise I have is similar to the merchandise on those 
orders. 
Q. You mean the merchandise itself is similar 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But hHd that merchandise been previously ordered by 
tlie retail merchants in Richmond? 
A. Some of it had, yes, sir. 
Q. But yon wouldn't say what portion of it had been previ-
ously ordered? 
A. No, sir. 
0. 011e of the exl1ibits filed bv vou is an order on a form 
of Mangels Herold Company, da'ted August 29th, which bears 
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in the caption Belicher 's Market and it has got; How shipped t 
R. F. Association Stores standing fop Richmond Food Stores. 
It is an order for one-half of a case of No. 5 King Syrup 
and -one case of No. 1~·2 Por-T-Rik. When that order is filled 
by the l\fangels Herold Company are those goods shipped 
to Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated 1 · 
A. ']~hat particular order or any of them would not be 
fil1ed by the manufacturers; it would be filled by me. 
Q. By wbomt 
page 101 r A. By me; the Richmond Food :Stores. 
Q. I understood that the merchandise referred 
to in these exhibits filed by you would be ordered by you 
from the manufacturer? 
A. Sure. 
Q. To be shipped either to your office or to the retailer? 
A. No, sir; to be shipped to me. 
Q. To you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So this merchandise would be shipped to Richmond 
Food Stores, Incorporated? · 
A. Yes. i;;ir. 
Q. And you would be billed by Mangels Herold Company¥ 
A. ,v ell, that particular order might not be billed at all; 
I might have enough in stock to take care of it. 
Q. Assuming you had no such syrup in stock and and had 
to order it from :rviangels Herold Company, what would you 
do? 
Mr. Gary: It would be billed to the R.ichmond Food Stores, 
Incorporated. vV c will admit that. 
A. Sure, they were billed to me. I would buy it for him. 
Q. You would buy it? 
A. Yes, i;;ir. 
l\fr. Gary: l~or him, you said. 
page 102 ~ By J\Ir. Miller : 
Q. ·what sort of order would you send the 
Mang-els Herold Com11m1y; a written order or Jetted 
J\. I would if I dicln 't catch a salesman. If I could catch 
a sal(_)smnn, I would give it to him. 
Q. "\Vhat would you give to the salesman? 
A. Give Mm the order for whatever I needed. 
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Q. A written orded 
A. He would write it down on a similar form to that. 
Q. On a similar form to this T 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then would he see that you would sign an order on 
Mangels Herold Company for shipment to you of this par-
ticular item of goods? 
A. If they required a signature. Very few I ever sign. 
Q. \Vell, it is perfectly plain then that Richmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated, would order directly from the manu-
facturer either through a written order sent direct to that 
manufacturer or a written order given to a salesman of that 
manufacturer, requesting that manufacturer to ship to Rich-
mond ~,ood St.ores, Incorporated, the goods in question and 
that the bill for those goods would be sent to Richmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated, in the name of Richmond Food Stores, 
Incorporated, and paid by Richmond Food Stores, Incorpo-
rated. Am I correcU 
page 103 ~ A. Absolutely, that is correct. 
Q. And then Richmond Food Stores, Incorpo-
rated, would phone or inform in some manner Bleicher 's 
Market tliat they could come and get that article of mer-
chandise, wouldn't you? 
A. He has a week to take that order. 
Q. Then he would either come down and get it or you would 
send it up to him T 
A. 1:es, sir. . 
Q. And what sort of hill would you send Bleicher's Mar-
kr.U ·would you send him a form billed out on that yellow 
sheet which luu; been introduced T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .Showing tl1at the Richmond Food rStores had sold to 
Bleichcr's Market certain articles of merchandise on cer-
tain terms; isn't that right? 
A. I would write it up on that. form, yes, sir. 
Q. What would it sl10w? 
A. Show just like you said. 
Q. Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, sold to Bleicher 's 
.Market so muc11 merchandise? 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Q. Giving the price and terms on which it was sold? 
Mr. Gnry: He testified there are no terms; it is all cash. 
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page 104 } A. It is all cash. 
Q. And that practise follows all through the 
business of the organization, does it not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The same sort of transactions occur 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As far as the payment to the producer or manufac-
turer is concerned the payments are made by Richmond 
· Food Stores, Incorporated, in its own name! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. To the manufacturer i 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the goods are shipped from the manufacturer to 
Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, at a :fixed pricef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you, in turn, deliver those goods to th~ retail mer-
chants as they need them and hill them on your own bill-
heads ancl they are liable to you and not the manufacturer 
as fa.r as any dii~ect contact is concerned 1 There is noth~ng 
in any signed order from them directing them to pay to· the 
manufacturer· for the purchase of these goodst 
A. No, sir, they are not liable. 
Q. And often those orders that are used and filed as exhibits 
show that the merchandise in many cases is 
page 105 } handled thro"Qgh a wl10lesaler or a jobber, do they 
noU 
A. What is the question againf 
Note! Question reac1. 
A. The same: manufacturer calls on me calls on the whole-
saler or jobber. 
Q. I mean the orders themselves show in so many words: 
"\Vholmmle grocer R. F. Stores in one case; shipment through 
jobber in another case; wbolesaler in another case; whole-
saler in another case; jobber in another case, and in each of 
tho8e instances the words R. F. Stores or Richmond Food 
Stores or something· to indicate tlrnt the Richmond Food 
Stores, Incorporated, was considered either the wholesaler 
or the jobber in the memorandum order; isn't that rig·ht Y 
A. I don't know. "When a salesman starts out with an 
order hook his principal doesn't know wl1ether he is going to 
sell a jobber or a cooperative; he makes one form to .suit 
all. 
Q. Will you look at those and see if that isn't the. case in 
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. some of those orders f But never mind; the order speaks 
for itself. · 
A. These forms are drawn up by the manufacturer; I don't 
have anything to do with the drawing of the form. 
Q. I do not, of course, hold you responsible for the form, 
but it is a fact that the forms do show that the 
page 106 } wholesaler or jobber enters into the transaction, 
does it notf 
A. I wouldn't say so, no, sir, because the same manufac- . 
turer would sell Miller & Rhoads, for example, the same goods 
that I bought. 
Q. What was the total capital of the corporation on De-
cember 31, 1938? $47,250.001 
A. E,orty some thousand; yes, sir. 
Q. And wasu 't $4,600.00 of that represented by a distribu-
tion in membership certificates made by the corporation to 
the members 1 That is right, isn't it 1? 
A. $4,600.00 f 
Q. Yes. 
A. Additional shares, yes, sir. 
Q. That wasn't anything in the world but a stock dividend, 
was iU 
A. No, sir, it wasn't a stock dividend. 
Q. A certificate dividend then? 
A. It was a stock certificate issued to those who had suf-
ficient amount in their overcharge account.. A dividend in 
the ordinary corporation would have to be distributed among 
all the stockholders. 
Q. ·what report did you make to the Corporation Commis-
sion for the purpose of obtaining· permission to issue those 
particular certificates? 
A. I think our charter stated we could issue so many cer-
tificates up to a cel'tain amount. 
page 107 ~ Q. To be paid for in cash at par? 
A. I don't know about that. I tl1ink we were 
allowed to issue so many stock certificates. 
Mr. Gary: That is right and that was considered as a 
cash payment. 
Mr. :Miller: Is it stipulated all the stock was issued at 
par cash f Is it necessary for me to prove the stock of the 
corpom tion can only be issued by the pay"!Hmt in cash or 
its equivalent up to tl1e face value of tho stock-par value 
of the stock? · 
Mr. Gary: Yes, that is right. 
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By Mr. Miller : 
<l The corporation got in payment of that $4,600.00 · of 
stock $4,600.00 in cash obtained by making· ·charg·es against 
the overcharge account of the former stockholders, did it 
not? 
A. vVe Jmven 't received any cash at all; it was an account-· 
ing transaction. 
Q. ·well, it was a cash entry on the books t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Representing $4,600.00 of receipts f 
A. No, sir; we didn't receive any cash. 
Q. I don't mean you actna Jly g·ot the money, but you treat 
it as cash for bookkeeping purposes, did you not ·l 
page 108 ~ A. No, sir, a cash transaction goes on the cash 
book and that was not treated that way; it was 
a journal entry. 
Q. Dori 't journal entries reflect cash transactions as wel1 
as cash receipts and delivery of money! 
A. If you want to go back to old style accounting you can 
run everything on the journal, but in modem accounting we 
have regular cash books for regular cash entries. 
Q. vVell, assuming-I believe you have already testified 
that your total capitalization is $47,250.00 at the end of busi- -
ness on December 31, J.938. Assuming that that was the 
same as the capitalization on January 1, 1938, how many 
times is that capital turned over throug·h 1938 in your mer-
chandise transactions t 
A. How many times is the capital turned overt 
Q. Yes, sir. You used a capitalization of $47,250.00 to 
do a gToss business of $551,026.27, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It took that much money to handle that much merchan-
dise. So that was roughly about something· over ten times 
turnover, wasn't it? 
A. I would imag'ine it would be around about that, yes. 
Q. And the gToss 1wofit on that, called by you a gross mar-
gin on sales. was 4.79? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now that is tho percentage of the gross 
page 109 ~ ma rgfo on sale::,-; with respect to the entire sales. 
Your _gToss mar~fo on sales w·as $26,389~ obtained 
frnm tl1e use of $47,250 of canital. That is roug·hlv about 
17 or 18%, is it not? 17 or 18% of $47,000 is about $26,000? 
.A. You mean haSPfl on capital? 
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Q. Yes. I was trying to get you to say what was the re· 
turn on capital. 
A. I don't know what the return is; I haven't figured it 
out. 
Q. ·wm you take a pencil and paper and figure it outf 
.l1.. You can divide it there and find out. 
Mr. Gary: 'l'he figures speak for themselves. The facts 
are there. You can draw any deduction at all you want to. 
The Court: Mr. Miller can figm~e it out. 
By Mr. Miller : 
Q. nlr. \\Thitlock, the company has been able to enter up a 
credit to its members account every year since its organiza-
tion in April, 1927; what. you call overcharges, has it not? 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Q. And the total amount of those overcharges up to De-
cember 31, 1938, is $14,805.86 as shown in the audit; that is 
right, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
page 110 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Gary: , 
Q. 1\fr. Whitlock, l\fr. :Miller referred to the fact these or-
ders taken bv the various manufacturers in certain instances 
show: Wholesaler's name-Richmond Food Stores. Who 
prepared these order blanks? 
A. These blanks were prepared hy the manufacturers. 
Q. vYbo inserted the name Richmond Food Stores. after 
the printed portion: Wholesaler's name? 
A. The salesman who took the order. 
Q. So that neither the Richmond Food Stores nor any of 
its members have anything to do with that designation? 
A. No, sir, not a bit. 
Q. Now you testified that using these orders as a basis 
yon placc!<l an order with the manufacturers, that those· goods 
were shipped to the association, that the association then 
cfo~tribufod those goods to its members and when the goods 
were cfo~tributed it was placed on the form of the Richmond 
Food Rt.ores which has been introduced as Exhibit No. 22. 
Now wl1en thev were listed on the blank of the Richmond 
Food Rtores w11at price was listed on the blank~ 
A. ·w1rn t price? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. The price of our mark-up, whatever our 
pag·e 111 } mark-up was on that item, the 470. 
Q. The cost of the goods to you plus the 4% 
mark-up that yo1i. had put on those goods 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. If they were dcliYerecl to the member by the associa-
tion, an additional 1 % was added for delivery charge Y 
A. That is right. . 
Q. If the member came to the store and got those goods, 
it was the cost plus the 4% mark-up? 
A. Yes., sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Mr. Whitlock, does the Federal Government audit yol!r 
books! 
A. I think that we did have one auditor in there since we 
orp:anized. 
Q. Did you file a Federal return t 
A. Yes. 
Q. What sort of return did you file? 
A. What kind of return are you talking abouU 
Q. Income tax return t 
A. Yes, sir, we file them. 
Q. Do you pay a Federal income tax? 
A. Is that pertinent to this question .to this case? 
Mr. Gary: I don't. think it has any bearing. 
page 112} The Court: I think it is perfectly proper. 
The Witness: What was the question again 1 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. Do you pay a iFederal income tax¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because the Federal Government has ruled that we are 
a cooperative group. 
Q. When clid they make that ruling f 
A. I don't. ]rnO"w. hut it is the ruling. 
Q. Prior to April, 1937? 
A. I don't know. Q. Can you find out? 
A. I don't know as they made it; but they have exempted 
11s as being a cooperative group. 
Witness stood ·aside. 
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a witness introduced in behalf of the petitioner, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Miller : 
Q. Mr. Taylor, you are with A. 1VI. Pullen & Company, a 
certified public accountant 1 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. You Hre a certifi-ed public accountant yourself¥ 
A. No, sir. I am not. 
Q. Did you make the audit for the Richmond Food Stores t 
A. I made some of them; some of them were made by dif-
ferent members of tho staff. 
CJ. Did you prepare the statement showing the balance 
sheets and operating· expenses that were filed here this morn-
ingf .. 
A. Not all those years, no. I think two other gentlemen 
prepared 1936 ancl 193S and I think I prepared 1937. I dicln>t 
11repare 1938. 
Q. What is the last time you made an audit personally? 
A. ,Tune 30, 1939. 
Q. \Vhat is the :first time you made an audit personallyf 
A. I couldn't tell without access to our records. You mean 
personally myself f 
page 114 ~ Q. Personally. 
records. 
A. I really don't know without looking up the 
Q. Do you know anything about a Federal ruling as to 
exemption T 
A. I know we have had the question up with them in Wash-
ing·ton. 
Q. Do you know when, approximatelyf 
A. "\Ve ]mve had it up with them in the past few years. Mr. 
Mudd handled t11at phase of it entirely. 
Q. "\Vas it prior to April, 1'937 i 
A.. I wouldn 't like to state. 
Q. Have you any recollection of it. at all¥ 
A. I have a recollection of tlie fact that the matter has 
been up with the Revenue Department, but as to t]w final 
disno~;ition of the thing I am not as well informed on that 
as he would be. 
Q. They show in the audit net overcharges carried in the 
balance sheet as an item due to members, pro rata distribu-
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tion of overcharges. From an accounting point of view does 
that represent profits or not 1 
A. Well, from the nature of the organization they do not 
consider it that way, due to the fact, as I understand it, it 
is a non-profit organization. We have always considered it 
was really a return or adjustment of their purchases and not 
profits for the organization. 
Q. Well, if it were an ordinary business con-
page 115 ~ cern, that would represent a net return 1 
A. Where the nature of the business was dif-
ferent and where tho customers were other than members it 
would probably be construed as profits, yes. 
Q. There are many concerns that deal only w~th the stock-
holders. Does the difference between dealing with a stock-
holder and the public determine whether it is a profit or 
not1 
A. You would have to go into the basis of the original 
basis on which the corporation was organized. If it was 
organized as a non-profit org·aniza.tion, anything they would 
make or anything that would accrue ·in there would be an 
adjustment of tlH~ir purchases and referred back to those 
members. 
Q. You arc referring· to the original organization prior to 
l 987, arc you not! 
A. No~ sir, because I never worked on it then. 
Q., This company was organized in April, 1937, but if as 
a. matter of law there is no objection to their making money, 
as a matte1: of accounting is there any objection to calling it 
profit¥ 
:Mr. Gary: The charter provides it shall be a non-pro.fit 
organization. 
Mr. Miller: In accordance with the provisions of 3855 
of the Code of Virginia there is nothing in the 
pap;e 116 ~ law that forbids the organization from making a 
pro.fit. 
Q. The chnrter and by-laws refer to dividends and provide 
for payment of dividends. Tliat is a fact, isn't it f 
1\fr. Gary: It is not a profit. 
Ry ".Mr. Miller: 
Q. There are provisions in the charter and by-laws for 
tlrn payment of dividends. That is rigllt, isn't iU 
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A. I haven't seen tbe charter provisions. I work on so 
many different people I wouldn't like to say. 
l\fr. Gary: Tl1e charter and by-laws speak for themselves. 
The Court: That is a perfectly legitimate question to ask 
an accountant who made up the balance sheets, but he states 
it is no profit. 
Mr. Gary: He asked him if the charter and by-laws did 
not provide for dividends and the charter and by-laws should 
speak for themselves; tl1ey are in the record. 
The Court: He made the statement that the by-la:ws and 
charter provide for dividends. 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. I will ask you to. look at article 8 of the by-laws and see 
if thne is a provision there for the payment of 
page 117 ~ dividends from net earnings. It is on page nine . 
.A. What is the question again 1 
Q. Does not that provide for the payment of dividends 
from the net earnings of the association 7 
A. It does, based on the patron, but not on the capital 
stock. 
Q. That ckesn 't keep it from being· a dividend, nor does it 
keep it from being ,a net earning or profit, does iU 
A. I think that is for the Court to construe. 
Q. I am asking you as an accountant and as a matter of 
accounting whether or not there is aI\y reason why the item 
shovrn ::is pro rata distribution of overcharges to members 
cannot be a part of the net earnings of this association. 
Mr. Gary: 1\fay it please tlie Court, we object to that be-
cam:;e if.. is a question of law. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
A.. Personally, I don't think so because the overcharges 
are an adjustment of t]1eir purc.hases and arc returnable to 
them. based directly on what they bought during the year 
:md docs not accrue or is not distributed on the basis of capi-
tal Rnl)scription. It is 011 the basis of the ownership of stock, 
but as we see it. it is primarily an adjustment on tl1eir pur-
clrnses during the year beeause basically it w:as established 
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as a non-profit organization and when a mer-
}Jage 118 ~ chant buys it is assumed no pro.fit will be made 
on his purchase; consequently, this can be ad-
justed, only once a year and adjusted on the ha.sis of his pur-
chases. 
Q. And you say that can't represent earnings of the asso-
ciation? 
A. I wouldn't say "can't". I say in my humble opinion 
it does not. 
Q. In your opinion as an accountant can that represent 
earnings of the association¥ I know, of course, the corpora-
tion does not so call it and you haven't so called it in the 
audit, but is there any accounting principle which forbids 
this from being a part of the net earnings of the associa· 
tionf 
A. It all depends on the way you look at it. 
Q. I am looking at it from your knowledge of the prin-
ciples of accounting. 
A. It is an earning, but it is an earning based primarily 
on purchases which are reimbursed hack. It is an adjustment 
which is merely an overcharge. Suppose they had a loss 
there or an under charge-
Q. What would happen? Is there anything in the by-laws 
·to provide for that? 
A. It would be charged to the individual accounts. 
Q. Is there anything in.the by.laws to provide for thaU 
A. I don't know. 
page 119 } Q. Vv ouldu 't it have to be charged to this ac· 
count f "'\V' ouldn 't any loss sustained have to be 
charged to this overcharg·e f 
A. That is right. 
Witness stood aside. 
Note: At this time the Court adjourned until tomorrow, 
September 16, 1939. 
pag-e 120 ~ September 16, 1939. 
The Court convened pursuant to adjournment. 
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a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMI,i~ATION. 
By Mr. Miller~ 
Q. Mr. Mudd, you are Mr. "\V. A. Mudd 0l 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are a certified public accountant with A. l\I. Pullen 
& Company? 
A. I am a tax accountant. 
Q. ·with A. M. Pullen & Company! 
A. That is right. 
Q. Aud have been employed there for quite a wbilef 
A. '1\venty years. 
Q. Are you familiar with the books and records of the 
Richmond Food Stores in so far as they relate to tax mat-
ters? 
A. Yes; I am somewhat familiar with the tax matters, not 
especially the books. 
Q. Do you know of any ruling by the Commis-
page 121 ~ sioner of Internal Revenue for the Federal Gov-
ernment with respect to their tax status 'l 
A. I do. 
Q. Have you got such a ruling with you 1 
A I have. 
Q. May I see it, sir? 
Note: A docun;ient produced. 
Q. This ruling does not relate specifically to Richmond 
],ood Stores, Incorporated, does iU 
A. Yes, sir; already applied. 
Q. What yon hand me is simply a quotation from a Treas-
ury decision issued in December, 1936; and does not mention 
Richmond li,ood Stores. Is that right;/ 
A. That might be true, but they have already applied it to 
the Richmond Food Stores. 
Q. Have you got any specific ruling from the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue with respect to Richmond F·ood Stores? 
A. I have got their own report. 
Q. May I see that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. This report is dated February 11, 1939, from the Treas-
ury Department and addressed to the Richmond Food Stores, 
is it noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does this report show tba t this company is 
page 122 ~ liable for a Federal income tax 0? 
A. It does because, Mr. :Miller, the requirements 
of the Department-the Department did call on them for the 
tax for 1936 and a small amount for 1937, but that wasn't be-
cause the Department hadn "t ruled this was taxed as divi-
dends, in other words, a refund, but be.cause they had not en-
tered this refund of 1936 on the tax; they did afterwards. 
Q. Will you show me where the report shows the reason 
for the assessmenU 
N otc: "\\7itness does so. 
Mr. Miller: !Ir. :Mudd points to a paragraph on page one 
of the preliminary statement as follows: '' During 1936 no 
distribution was made, nor were the net earnings set up as 
a liability on the corporation's books as of December 31, 193tJ. 
Therefore, it is held that the corporation was subject to tax 
on its undistributed net earnings for 1936.'' 
M:r. Gary: Is there a paragraph there in reference to 
1937 that should also be reacl in the record 'f I just thought 
you would put it all in together. 
:Mr. Miller: There is another paragraph follow-
page 123 ~ ing that, reading as follows: '' During 1937 the 
taxpayer distributed to or credited to members 
pro rata all net earnings of the corporation for 1937 except 
$802.40, which was added to the reserve for contingencies. 
In addition to the reserve for contingencies, the taxpayer de-
ducted attorney fees in the amount of $507.00 paid in con-
nection with amending· charter. It is held that the corpora-
tion is subject to tax on the above two items. The corpora-
tion's accountant A. l\I. Pullen & Company was advised of 
the proposed adjustment shown on this report, but same will 
not be agreed to. Protest will therefore he filed.'' 
By Mr. Miller: 
Q. l\fr. Mudd, isn't it true that the Federal law permits such 
a corporation to deduct from its taxable income these pro 
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1:ata distributions of earnings only when the corporation is a 
true co-operative organization; isn't that rig·ht 1 
A.. Well, in this. case the Revenue Agent's office held it 
was. 
Q. Held whaU 
A. Held this company was a co-operative evidently because 
they allowed that distribution in 1937. 
page 124 ~ Q. Have you got a copy of a letter from the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 1937 l10ld-
ing that this company was not entitled to such exemption f 
A. First an application was made for exemption. It was 
made through our office and came to me and I couldn't .see 
anything in the law, sections 101 (12), that made it an exempt 
corporation, but anyhow they filed the application and claimed 
exemption. The Department came back and denied the ex-
. emption status and required them to file a tax return. Well, 
then, the question came up as to the rebates under this agree-
ment. Then, of course, we found the ruling of the depart-
ment which applied on this exemption. Now the non-apply-
ing of that rebate-the practice in 1936 wasn't set up on 
the books until later. That is now being contested from a 
technical standpoint. Vve have never agTeed to that because 
we think it is due to the members and that they should be al-
lowed to do it. 
Q. Has there been any ruli1ig by the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue issued in 1937 that this company was not en-
titled to the exemption afforded in Section 101, paragraph 
12, of the Revenue A.ct? 
A. Yes, sir, the Commissioner has ruled on Odoher 4, 1937, 
that it was not exempt. 
Q. That it was not exempt f 
_page 125 r A. Was not exempt from filing the tax returns. 
CROSS EXAMINATION . 
. By Mr. Gary: 
Q. You say the Commissioner ruled that tl~e corporation 
was not exempt from filing a tax return in-ruled in 1937 that 
the corporation was not exempt from filing-
A. Wasn't exempt any year from filing a tax return. 
Q .. Now you say there is a ruling· of the United States Com-
missioner of Internal Reyenue. This paper which you showed 
Mr. Miller is a Treasury decision issued in December, 1936 ! 
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A. I might mention there I don't know that they issued 
that. That rulh1g· there was furnished us by a national as-
sociation in Vv ashington and they evidently did make that 
ruling because the government in making· exemptions in 1936 
and 1937 applied it. 
l.\fr. Gary: We ·wish to introduce this. 
Mr. Miller: I object to the introduction of that on the 
ground that it is nothing in the world. but a copy of some 
Treasury reg'Ulation. It is not identified in any way· at all. 
Mr. Gary: You called for it. 
Mr. Miller: I didn't call for it. I asked if he had a report 
from the Commissioner or ruling from the Com-
page 126 ~ missioner of Internal Revenue when that was pre-
sented. I questioned him and asked him· if it 
wasn't simply a copy of a quotation from a Treasury de-
cision and he said yes. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Gary: Exception. 
Q. Do you know what the ruling is of the Treasury Depart-
ment with respect to cooperative associations? · 
A. "\Vell, the only thing· I can tell you is if you ref er to this 
protest you will see what the rulings were made by the 
courts. 
Q. No; do you know ,vhat the ruling of the Department is T 
A. The only thing· I know is this ( referring to document) 
and the Revenue Agent's report. 
Q. Now let me see the Revem'te Agent's report. This re-
port of the Revenue Agent of the Treasury Department was 
made for 1936 and 1937; is that correcU · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had the corporation filed returns for those years 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They had filed returns 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what had they shown in their returns? 
Mr. Miller: I object, if Your Honor please, un-
page 127 ~ less this shows the purpose of proving· what was in 
the returns. My question to ::Mr. Mudd as a witness 
for the City was simply as to the rulings of the Commissio.ner 
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of Internal Revenue with respect to this company's status 
as a taxpayer. He introduced in response to that question 
a report of a Treasury audit which was not asked for or 
called for by the City and I object to the introduction of that 
report and any information in respect to the ta:x; returns in 
the record. I don't think they are material to the issue in 
this case. · 
l\Ir. Gary: May it please the Court, may I say there that 
the allowance has been made by the rrreasury Department for 
19:37. The purpose of my question is merely to show that 
fact. 
'11hc Court: It wouldn't be sufficient to testify from that 
that the Treasury had ruled one way or the other. 
Mr. Gary: But it would show if their return for 1937 has 
been approved. 
The Court: I think the whole matter whether they pay a 
Federal income tax is irrelevant to the issue involved in this 
case. 
l\Ir. Gary: I agree with you thorougl1ly. 
page 128 ~ The Court: Therefore, I sustain the objection 
and if necessary strike all the evidence in con-
nection with the income tax to the Federal Government out 
of the record. There is nothing in the Jaw that says, as I see 
it, that has any bearing- on the question of whether or not 
they should pay a commission merchant's lieense or a whole-
sale merchant's license and that is the issue here, as I un-
derstand it and what the Federal chooses to do on an income 
feature seems to me to haye no beal'ing at all. 
Mr. Gary: May it please the Court, I think that is per-
fectly true but the Federal Government has ruled that this is 
a true cooperative association. 
·witness stood aside. 
Mr. Mi11er: I offer the extract from the Richmond City 
Code, published by the city, which purports to be and is of-
f ere cl as a true copy of the existing city license laws, em-
bracing the entire chapter 10 and ask it to he treated as if it 
were formally introduced .in evidence. 
The Court : All right. 
page 129 ~ l\Ir. Gary: !fay it please the Court, may we 
also have an understanding and stipulation that 
any other ordinances of the city that are vital to this ques-
Richmond Food Stores, Inc/, v. City of Richmond. 99 
tion may be considered as having been introduced in ev1-
denceT 
The Court: All right, si~·. 
Mr. Gary: I don't know that there are any others, hut we 
want to protect ourselves. 
Note: The case was argued at length. 
The Court: I am of the opinion the facts in this case show 
that the retail merchants of Richmond or a great number of 
them decided upon the organization of an association for the 
purpose of competing ag·ainst the buying-particularly the 
buying ability of the chain stores. From the very nature of 
the competition that this corporation will have to enter info 
in order to successfully compete ag·ainst the buying ability 
of the chain corporations it must buy before orders are re-
ceived from its retail stores. I think that fact in itself makes 
it a separate merchant a11:d not the agent of the retailers, ex-
cept indirectly, and therefore I think that theY. should pay a 
tax as a wholesale merchant and not as a commission mer-
chant and I think also that if they were not wholesale mer~ 
chants, they are more nearly distributo·rs and, of course, would 
pay the same wholesale tax.· If they were agents 
page 130 ~ they would be distributors for the stores, and 
wouldn't have to ·have a wholesale license to do 
that, and if that is not so the A. & P. or whatever other chain 
concern is involved would have another, I think; reasonaqle 
ground for contending that the distributor's tax as imposed 
upon them is uneonstitutional. 
In view of the situation that the city authorities had ac-
cepted the tax as commission merchants, I think, of ~ourse, 
there ought to he a credit of that and there should not be any 
penalty· or interest for the past year. 
lvir. Miller: If Your Honor please, I did not discuss the 
penalty or interest, hut there is no statutory authority for 
relief there. The city notes an exception to Your Honor's 
ruling in that respect. 
Mr. Gary: And we note an exception to Your Hop or's rul-
ing- on the merits of the case, if Your Honor please. 
The Court: Between the date of tl1e trial and argument · 
of the case and the date of the entrv of the final order herein, 
I g·ave further consideration to the question of penalty and 
interest, and concluded that I did not have the authority to 
relieve the penalty or interest and I so stated my conclus~ons 
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to the counsel for both sides at the time of the entry of the 
final order. 
page 131 ~ Virginia: 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
Richmond Food Stores, Incorporated, Plaintiff, 
v. 
City of Richmond, Defendant. II 
S.TI.PULATION. 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed between the parties 
hereto, by counsel, that the exhibits introduced during the 
trial of this case need not be copied as a part of the record 
and that all such exhibits in this case shall be certified by 
the Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond and 
shall be subject to production and use in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia· as provided hy law. 
RICH:~\IOND FOOD STORb~.S, INCORPORATED, 
By J. VAUGHAN GARY, Counsel. 
By tTOHN J. WICKEH, JR.., Counsel. 
THE CITY OF RICHMOND, 
By HENRY R. MILLER, JR., 
Assistant City Attorney. 
page 132 ~ .JUDGEJ'S CERi,IFICATE. 
I, John L. Ingram, .Judge of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia, who presided over the 
fore going- trial of the case of Richmond Food Stores, Inc., 
1.Jersus City of Richmond, in said court, at Richmond, Vir-
ginia, September 15th and 16th, 1939, do certify that the fore-
going, together with the exhibits therein referred to, is a true 
and correct copy and report' of all the evidence, together with 
all the motions, objections and exceptions on the part of the 
respective partie!S, the action of the Court with respect thereto, 
and all other incidents in the said trial of the said case. 
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And I further certify that the attorneys for the defendant 
had reasonable notice, in writing, given by counsel for the pe-
titioner, of the time and place when the foregoing report of 
the testimony, together with all the motions, objections and 
exceptions on the part of the respective parties, the action of 
the Court with respect thereto, and all other incidents in the 
said trial would be tendered and presented to the undersigned 
for signature and authentication, and that the said report 
was presented to me on the 24th day of ,June, 1940, within 
less than sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in 
said case. 
page 133 } Given under my hand this 27 day of June, 1940. 
JNO. L. INGRAM, 
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City of 
Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
CLERK'S CE,RTIFICATE. 
I, Thos. R. Miller, Deputy Clerk of the Hustings Court of 
the City of Richmond, Richmond, Virg·inia, do hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing is a true copy of the report of the 
testimony, together ·with all the motions, objections and ex-
ceptions on the part of the respective parties, the action of 
the Court with respect thereto, and all other hicidents of the 
trial in the case of Richmond Food Stores, Inc., versus City 
of Richmond, in said court, at Richmond, Virginia, on Sep-
tember 15th and 16th, 1939, and that the original thereof and 
copy, tog·ether with the original exhibits therein referred to, 
duly authenticated by the Judge of said court, were lodged 
and . filed with me as Deputy clerk of the said court on the 
27 day of June, 194:0. 
Given under my hand this 27 clay of June, 1940. 
THOS. R. :MILLER, 
Deputy Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia. 
page 134 ~ I, Thos. R. Miller, Deputy Clerk of the Hust-
ings Court of the City of Richmond, Richmond, 
Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing· is a true and 
correc.t transcript of the record in the case of Richmond 
Food Stores, Inc., versus City of Ricl1mond, lately deter-
102 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
mined in said court; and I do further certify that counsel 0£ 
record for the said defendant had due notice of the intention· 
of counsel for the petitioner to apply for said transcript be-
fore the same was made out and delivered. 
Given under my hand this 27 day of June, 1940. 
THOS. R. MILLER, 
Deputy Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City 
of Richmond, Ric.hmond, Virginia. 
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